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Abstract
For the first 150 years of the existence of the judicial power, it was liberals who advocated for
the limited role that the Supreme Court should play in America’s constitutional democracy.
Since the 1960’s and the Civil Rights Movement, there has been an increase in liberal judicial
activism. This thesis seeks to explore the progression of judicial restraint and activism over the
history of the Supreme Court through the eyes of Louis Boudin, a constitutional expert writing in
the 1930’s. Boudin, a radical liberal, asserts in Government By Judiciary that the judicial branch
has been constantly expanding its own power far beyond the scope intended by the Framers of
the Constitution as evidenced by ever-increasing activism. Boudin believes the Judiciary is
threatening the very existence of the American constitutional democracy. This paper provides
and in depth analysis of Boudin’s arguments and applies them to the modern judicial power
through the Rehnquist Court.
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Introduction
Ideas and ideals of judicial restraint and activism have influenced the decision-making of
many Supreme Court justices since the Framers of the Constitution created American judicial
power in the late eighteenth century. For the first 150 years of the judicial history of the nation,
the partisan divide among justices could be seen by their approach to judicial restraint and
activism in deciding cases that come before the Court. Judicial restraint calls for allowing for the
Executive and Legislative branches, as well as the governments of the states, to function without
unnecessary interference by the Judiciary, save in the case of a clear constitutional violation.
Restraint requires the justices to presume the constitutionality of laws unless no reasonable
person would believe them to be constitutional, a “low-bar rational basis” test. Judicial activism
occurs when justices accept as their role and partake in the functions typically reserved for the
popularly elected branches and those of the states. Activism represents the expansion of judicial
decision-making in order to address matters of policy and resolve contentious issues facing the
nation.
This thesis seeks to explore the progression of restraint and activism over the history of
the Supreme Court through the eyes of Louis Boudin, a constitutional expert writing in the
1930’s. Boudin, a radical liberal, asserts in his two-volume work Government By Judiciary that
the judicial branch is constantly expanding its own power far beyond the scope intended by the
Framers of the Constitution as evidenced by ever-increasing activism. Boudin believes the
Judiciary is threatening the very existence of the American constitutional democracy. He argues
that when the Supreme Court takes on the qualities of the legislatures, both state and federal, it
becomes a super-legislature. This results in policy-making, which is far beyond the extent of the
Court’s powers as described in the Constitution. Boudin angrily asserts that this activism results
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in the creation of an undemocratic government of unelected and unaccountable men, instead of
the one of laws envisioned by the Framers.
In Government By Judiciary, Boudin explores the history of the United States Judiciary
chronologically, beginning with foreign judicial systems that predated the founding the United
States. The first chapter of this thesis introduces Boudin’s theory about how the Court should
function within the larger government structure and in relation to the other branches of
government. It examines the constitutional theory of his main influence, James Thayer, a
Harvard law professor and renowned constitutional expert, and it identifies similarities in the
way that both Thayer and Boudin consider constitutional questions based on their written works.
Boudin goes on to analyze the early years of the existence of Supreme Court, as the
justices and the nation tried to understand and define the nature and limits to its power. Chapter
Two examines the landmark decision Marbury v. Madison (1803) in which Chief Justice John
Marshall establishes the power of judicial review—the Supreme Court’s ability to strike down
pieces of legislation that the justices understand to contradict provisions of the Constitution.
This enables the Court, for the first time, to be the predominant interpreting authority interpreting
the Constitution and gives it the sole power of deciding whether or not a piece of legislation is
constitutionally valid. Boudin interprets this as an extraordinarily activist decision on the part of
Chief Justice Marshall, but explains that it was necessary for the fluid functioning of the
government under the Constitution. But Boudin also recognizes that this decision creates the
platform upon which generations of future justices can expand this power, building on
Marshall’s concept of judicial review. This expansion creates tremendous potential for abuse,
allowing the Judiciary to be essentially unchecked by the other branches.

5

Chapters Three, Four and Five delve into some of the cases that Boudin identifies to
represent major abuses of judicial power and examine his analysis of these activist decisions on
the part of the Supreme Court. Boudin uses these cases as tools to further his point that the Court
needs to be restrained in the way it operates especially in relation to the other branches of
government. Chapter Three specifically looks at the decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857).
It explores the specific nature of Chief Justice Taney’s decision and the impact that the Court’s
second voiding of a Congressional statute had on the nation. Boudin woefully concludes that
Taney fundamentally changed the power balance among the government branches and as he
redefined the nature of the judicial power.
Chapter Four evaluates Boudin’s view of the activism evidenced in Lochner v. New York
(1905). This case occurs at a time when economic policy questions were of great political
contention and conservatives and liberals on the Court were torn as to how much the states
should be able to regulate commerce using their “police powers.” Boudin charges that
conservatives favoring activism in trade and economics had completed the transformation of the
Court into a super-legislature with this decision. These justices made policy decisions when a
majority of the Court disagreed with the choices made by the states. Boudin concludes that the
Court’s striking down of a law regulating baking hours was an abuse of the judicial power and a
clear attempt by the Judiciary to use powers that were never granted to it by the Constitution.
Chapter Five examines the Court in its post-Lochner and pre-New Deal era in which its
activism was in flux. It examines the decade in which the Court tries to distance itself from the
Lochner case and finally overturns it in Bunting v. Oregon (1917). After this decision, however,
the Court reverses course again and moves back towards the constitutional philosophy it adopted
in Lochner with Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923). Boudin observes that judicial power by
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this time does not even remotely resemble that envisioned by the Framers in the Constitution or
even that developed by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison (1803).
Finally, Chapter Six examines the phenomenon that began in the 1950’s and 1960’s in
which liberal members on the Court (historically the strongest proponents of judicial restraint)
adopted a much more activist stance. Liberals faced a dilemma: they continued to advocate
restraint concerning questions of economic policy, but they wanted become more activist
concerning the protection of civil rights and civil liberties with the rise of the Civil Rights
Movement. This chapter looks at the changing nature of the Court after Chief Justice Warren
retired in 1969. It concludes with an examination of Chief Justice William Rehnquist and his
emphasis on the importance of judicial restraint. It goes on to analyze the similarities and
differences that can be seen between Rehnquist and Boudin’s understandings of judicial restraint.
This chapter also examines the fact that voting patterns on the Supreme Court have
become increasingly predictable as the constitutional philosophies of the justices have become a
more important aspect of the appointment process. This is a recent phenomenon that justices
have been asked to so definitively express their understanding of the Constitution. Once public,
it becomes very difficult for justices to diverge from those views and to render decisions on
Constitutional issues pragmatically on a case-by-case basis. This fact contributes to a decline in
the judicial restraint and leads the Court to become more activist, involving itself in those
functions originally assigned to other branches.

7

CHAPTER 1:
Louis Boudin’s Thoughts and Influences
Louis Boudin was born in Russia in 1874. When he was seventeen years old, his family
immigrated to New York City. When he arrived in America, he began his legal studies at New
York University, quickly emerging as a promising constitutional law scholar. From his youth in
Imperial Russia, Boudin was influenced by Marxist thinkers and soon joined the Socialist Labor
Party of America, developing a reputation for extreme liberal positions in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. Boudin published many works during his lifetime, including
Government By Judiciary, his two-volume work examining his view that the Judiciary
consistently and systematically usurped of power from the Executive and Legislative branches
and from the people themselves. Government By Judiciary was published in 1932 in the midst
of the Great Depression at the very end of President Herbert Hoover’s term and just before
President Franklin Roosevelt took office.
In this two-volume text, Boudin expresses his great frustration with the current state of
the Judicial Branch and the direction in which it is headed. Boudin understands the Judiciary to
be a mechanism to resolve power-based disputes between the Constitution and other Federal and
state laws or statutes. Boudin asserts that the Court should begin with the assumption that a law
or statute is constitutional and apply a low-bar rational basis test to confirm or deny this
assumption. When it applies this test, most legislation is found to be constitutional. By contrast,
when the Court tries to assess whether a statute is “reasonable” based upon its substance, its
evaluation too closely resembles legislating, and the Court is performing functions that are
beyond the powers allotted to the courts by the Constitution.
Boudin identifies a fundamental shift taking place in the Judiciary from the time of the
Marbury v. Madison (1803) decision—which officially asserted the Court’s power of judicial
8

review—and the period in which he was writing in the early 1930’s. He argues over time the
Judiciary has departed from its true and appropriate function in American governance and is
becoming a super-legislature. He believes that this has happened slowly, over the course of
years, as a number of justices have parsed out the implications and pushed the boundaries of the
power of judicial review, in the process losing sight of the true function of the Judiciary. Boudin
points out that not all justices have lost sight of the limitations on the role of a judge, but fewer
of these individuals have been present on the bench as time goes on. He writes, “If we compare
the decade 1818-1828 in our judicial history, with that of 1918-1928, perhaps the most striking
difference will be found in the fact that the great opinions delivered in the United States Supreme
Court one hundred years ago were opinions delivered on behalf of the Court, while the great
opinions of our own decade were delivered in opposition to it.”1 (Emphasis in original)
For Boudin, in an ideal democratic society, there would be no need for a judicial branch
to resolve issues of power among the other branches because the Executive and Legislative
branches would function within the limits of their own powers as defined by the Constitution.
This would require the popularly elected representatives to abide by guiding principles, and this
in turn would inform the Court’s decision making in a consistent and thoughtful manner,
encouraging them to employ a low-bar rational basis test in examining laws and policies. It is
these principles that would lead the Court to produce restrained decisions. Boudin writes,
On principle there should be no such thing as Judicial Power. But even with the
Judicial Power principles are not useless. In fact, they are absolutely necessary, if
the courts are to remain courts instead of becoming super-legislatures. And
principles require the formation of hard and fast rules. At least, hard and fast for
all practical purposes. Even hard and fast rules will be deviated from at times.
But with such rules the Constitution, and the right of the people to selfgovernment, would be at least reasonably safe from judicial interference. 2
(Emphasis in original)
1
2

Louis B. Boudin, Government By Judiciary, vol. 2 (New York: William Goodwin), 1932, 548.
Ibid, 491.
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Boudin is extremely concerned with the apparent encroachment of the Judiciary on the
rights and power of the people to self-govern. He believes that developing rules is key to justices
better understanding the limits of their power. Because his ideal democratic society does not—
and cannot—exist, the judicial branch fills the role of mediating disputes of power involving the
Constitution. He justifies the existence of the judicial power by arguing,
As has been stated repeatedly in the course of this work, the entire basis of the
Judicial Power—the foundation upon which the entire structure is reared—is the
principle that an unconstitutional law never had any validity. That it is so much
waste paper—or, rather, waste motion. It is upon that theory only that the Judicial
Power can be justified. And the upholders of the Judicial Power have always
claimed that a court in declaring an act of Legislation unconstitutional does not
declare the law null and void, in the sense of making it null and void, but merely
establishes the proposition that the law has always been null and void,—it really
never existed.3 (Emphasis in original)
The Supreme Court, as a government institution, is inherently undemocratic in the eyes
of Louis Boudin because, unlike the Executive and Legislative branches, the justices on the
Court are not popularly elected and serve life terms only contingent on proper behavior. Boudin
understands this to be a necessary evil to enable the Courts to make difficult decisions without
concern for public opinion or political pressure. But this judicial structure creates the conditions
for judges to easily abuse the power they are given and to override the people’s ability to selfgovern. One of the main motives for Boudin to write Government By Judiciary was to respond
to what he saw as increasing irresponsibility of justices in the wielding of their official powers.
Boudin believes that as Courts issue decisions based upon powers they do not directly possess,
the people—and the ability of the people to democratically govern—is slowly diminished.
Boudin cites the lack of accountability in the judicial branch as the reason why judicial power
can expand with few repercussions.
3

Ibid, 352.
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In American society, the Supreme Court is less well understood than the other branches
of government in large part because of this lack of accountability. If Congressional
representatives are not to some degree transparent to their constituents or vote in ways that the
people do not approve, they can simply be removed from office during the next election cycle.
This is not the case with the Judiciary. It operates with an air of mystery. Boudin elaborates,
“The Legislature always acts in the full light of day, and in a manner to be easily understood by
any intelligent citizen; while the courts, on the other hand, do their work in the seclusion of a
court room, protected by a smoke-screen of technical jargon which is utterly unintelligible to the
ordinary citizen.”4
The perplexing nature of the Court is exacerbated by the occasional choice to address
questions that are not central to a given case or, conversely, to avoid answering a question that
the public sees as important. Despite Boudin’s warnings, this is a phenomenon that has
continued to occur on the Supreme Court long after Boudin wrote.
But the most important difference between the action of the Legislature and that
of the Judiciary is that the Legislature always proceeds to attack problems
directly, while the courts frequently attack them indirectly and in a manner
calculated to obscure the real issues involved. Thus the country often knows
nothing of what is actually happening to it while the courts are deciding its
fate…[O]rdinarily, the true meaning and possible effects of a court decision are
seldom known to the laity, and sometimes not even to the legal profession.5
Boudin’s constitutional philosophy was highly influenced by that of James Thayer, a
Harvard Law School professor and leading constitutional law expert in the nineteenth century.
In his article, “The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,” Thayer
outlined his views on the proper role of the Judiciary. He argues that the Courts need to be
restrained in their decision-making in order to fulfill their proper role in the constitutional

4
5

Ibid, 289.
Ibid, 289.
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democracy. Thayer was Boudin’s first inspirational for his own constitutional theory. It was
Thayer who proposed the rational basis test to determine the constitutionality of legislation and
argued for great deference to the Legislature in matters of policy-making. Both Thayer and
Boudin argue that the Supreme Court should only strike down a law if there is a blatantly
obvious violation of the Constitution that “any rational man” could identify. Thayer claims that
the Court’s power was greatly expanded with Marbury v. Madison (1803), and its fundamental
nature changed. In the century after Chief Justice John Marshall wrote this landmark opinion,
the power of the Judiciary expanded even more to become what Boudin identifies as a dangerous
tool building to levels far beyond what was intended in the Constitution. Thayer believes it is a
slippery slope when justices insert themselves in the functioning of the other two popularly
elected branches. He argues it is difficult to contain once the power of the courts spiral out of
control.
In his article, Thayer seeks to clarify the process through which the Judiciary should
strike down a piece of legislation as unconstitutional and develops a better understanding of the
true scope of the judicial power. Through an examination of the history of the Court postMarbury v. Madison (1803), Thayer identifies judicial restraint as one of the most important
values that a justice can embrace and defines it as essential to the functioning of a consistent and
thoughtful Court. He believes that restrained judges will be cognizant of the larger implications
of their rulings and will interfere with the Legislative and Executive branches only when they
have no alternative. He sees the Court’s role as to maintain the Constitution as the supreme
governing document of the United States and to ensure that subordinate laws and statutes do not
conflict with its provisions. Like Boudin, Thayer argues that justices should strike down
legislation only if no rational man could conceive it to be constitutional. This position raises
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serious questions when close five-four decisions that are handed down by the Court.
Boudin advocates for the concept of judicial restraint Thayer developed. In an
appreciation of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ similar constitutional philosophy, Boudin writes,
“And in so doing, he [Holmes] practically gives his own constitutional rule without attempting to
formulate one…It is the familiar rule—long fought for by Mr. Justice Holmes, often stated in the
name of the Supreme Court, but unfortunately never adhered to—that a law must be utterly
unreasonable in order to give a court the right to declare it unconstitutional.”6 Boudin also looks
to Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan (1924), a case that concerned the size and weight of bread being
sold in Nebraska, to define his own constitutional theory. The Court struck down this statute as
unconstitutional and Boudin points to Justice Louis Brandeis’ dissenting opinion to support his
view of the proper role of the Court and to identify when it is appropriate for the Court to strike
down statutes. Boudin quotes Justice Brandeis,
It is not our providence to weigh evidence. Put at its highest, our function is to
determine, in the light of all other facts which may enrich our knowledge and
enlarge our understanding, whether the measure, enacted in the exercise of an
unquestioned police power, and of a character inherently unobjectionable,
transcends the bounds of reason. That is, whether the provision, as applied, is so
clearly arbitrary or capricious that legislators, acting reasonably, could not have
believed it to be necessary or appropriate for the public welfare. To decide, as a
fact, that the prohibition of excess weights ‘is not necessary for the protection of
the purchasers against imposition and fraud by short weights’; that it ‘is not
calculated to effectuate that purpose’; and that it ‘subjects bakers and sellers of
bread’ to heavy burdens,—is, in my opinion, an exercise of the powers of a superlegislature,—not the performance of the constitutional function of judicial
review.7 (Emphasis in original)
Thayer explains that the people are responsible for electing their own representatives.
These representatives, whether members of Congress or the Executive branch, create and enforce
legislation that fills in the framework of the government institutions created by the Constitution.

6
7

Ibid, 488-489.
Ibid, 501.
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Since a formal election process takes place in which the people weigh their options for
representation, these popularly elected representatives will tend to be rational men and rational
men will rarely make irrational decisions. Following this line of logic, only very occasionally
will there be a statute that “no rational man would think to be constitutional.” Thayer writes in
his “The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,” “The constant
declaration of the judges that the question for them is not one of the mere and simple
preponderance of reason for or against, but of what is very plain and clear, clear beyond a
reasonable doubt.”8 Advocates of judicial restraint, like Thayer and Boudin, promote the idea
that the Court safeguards the people against rare irrational legislative actions and from the effects
they might have on the populace, the states, or the relationship between branches of government.
Thayer describes the duty of the Court to be, “the mere and simple office of constructing
two writings and comparing one with another, as two contracts or two statutes are construed and
compared when they are said to conflict; of declaring the true meaning of each, and, if they are
opposed to each other, of carrying into effect the construction as being of superior obligation,—
an ordinary and humble judicial duty, as the courts sometimes describe it.”9 Thayer bases his
views on the fact that judges are appointed, not popularly elected, and are therefore not
constrained in the way that the Legislative and Executive branches both are. Judicial review can,
however, be a double-edged sword for America’s constitutional democracy based on how the
justices chose to use this power. Judicial review, for Thayer, can be a positive tool to protect the
people from an encroaching government and enable the justices to make unpopular decisions
without fear of repercussions. But Thayer also believes that the power of judicial review can be

8

James B. Thayer, “The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,” Harvard Law
Review 7, no. 3 (1893), 151.
9

Ibid, 138.
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extremely dangerous and easily abused by justices with few and limited consequences. In
summary, Thayer points out that, “Under no system can the power of the courts go far to save
people from ruin; our chief protection lies elsewhere.”10
The lack of a mechanism to prevent justices from abusing the power of judicial review is
of real concern to both Thayer and Boudin. Adding to it is the fact that the individual justices
determine for themselves how they choose to interpret the Constitution. As a result, the job of a
President to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court becomes highly politicized with justices
capable of shaping American society for generations to come. During the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries when Thayer and Boudin lived, liberals tended to value judicial
restraint and to argue that over-involvement by the Courts had serious implications for the
balance of power both among the branches and between the state and Federal governments.11
Conservative justices, on the other hand, took a more activist stance, a position Thayer and
Boudin both warned against.
Today, during the Senate confirmation hearings of Supreme Court nominees, many speak
of their dedication to stare decisis and the precedents set by previous generations of justices.
Given the intense partisan divide currently plaguing Congress, the two most important goals that
Chief Justice John Roberts emphasized during his confirmation hearings were the need for
increased conformity on the Court and for a greater dedication to precedents when deciding
cases.12 Yet, in his short time on the Court, Chief Justice Roberts has demonstrated that he is
willing to break with precedent on highly contentious subjects like gun control, campaign
finance and corporate “speech.” This is precisely the kind of “judicial activism” that Boudin

10

Ibid, 156.
Ibid.
12
Marcia Coyle, The Roberts Court: The Struggle for the Constitution, First Simon & Schuster hardcover edition
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013), 84.
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warns against and represents what he would consider a Judiciary taking on the role of a superlegislature.
Boudin stresses a need for a strong reliance on precedent, saying it is key to both the
structure and function of the judicial branch. But, Boudin observes a significant movement away
from this value over the Court’s history: “But evidently our present Supreme Court is not only
less a respecter of the age of constitutional practices than was the Supreme Court under Marshall,
but it is also no respecter of its own prior decision—a characteristic displayed by all possessors
of absolute power. Once power become absolute, there is nothing that can stand in its way”13
(Emphasis in original). Boudin’s strong words suggest that he believes that the power of the
Judiciary is dangerously unchecked. This power has the potential to become absolute depending
on who is wielding it and how. If it ever becomes absolute, Boudin believes it will jeopardize
the very existence of America’s constitutional democracy.
Boudin argues that one characteristic that exacerbates this danger is that the United States
judicial branch is completely novel and different from any created before it. In order to prove
this, Boudin evaluates the judicial branches of foreign nations that were created before the
ratification of the U.S. Constitution. He observes that the American judicial branch has powers
that have traditionally been allocated to the legislatures in nations such as Great Britain and
France.14 Reserving these powers for the legislative branch enables current elected
representatives to be responsive to the demands of the people when creating policy. A system
lacking a wholly independent judiciary can be swayed by public opinion, but governance is by
men and women with something to lose from the decisions that they make—namely their
positions as part of the Legislative branch. Boudin contrasts this with the American Judiciary

13

Boudin, op. cit., 204.
Louis B. Boudin, Government By Judiciary, vol. 1 (New York: William Goodwin, 1932), 40-50.
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and recognizes that our system relies on a completely independent judiciary, meaning that the
nation can sometimes be governed by the decisions of dead men.
A careful review of the facts of our history on this showing forces one to the
conclusion that the only real difference between our government and the
governments of other civilized countries is that in other countries the Men are
accountable to the people, and their decisions are subject to be revoked and
reversed by the people; while in this country the Men who wield the real power of
the government are not accountable to the people, and their decisions are
irrevocable and irreversible except by themselves. The net result is that we are
ruled frequently by dead Men (not, however, the dead ‘Framers,’ but generations
of dead judges), and always by irresponsible Men.15 (Emphasis in original)
Boudin argues that these “irresponsible men” have ignored or forgotten the limits of the
powers granted to them by the Constitution and resemble a runaway train that strives to judge the
substance of a statute instead of answering a purely Constitutional question of power to legislate.
The judiciary has taken on the role of regulating and monitoring the Legislative branch, and the
justices now hand down decisions that are completely beyond their purview. Boudin argues that
deference should be granted to the popularly elected branches contingent on the respect of the
limits to their power to legislate and execute the law, which is the only proper question for the
Judiciary to consider.

15

Ibid, vii.
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CHAPTER 2:
Marbury v. Madison
The Marbury v. Madison (1803) decision signaled a fundamental shift in both the extent
of the judicial power and the role of the Supreme Court in America’s constitutional democracy.
Chief Justice John Marshall and his fellow justices were charged with settling a dispute between
then-Secretary of State James Madison and William Marbury. President John Adams had
appointed Marbury a Justice of the Peace in Washington, D.C., but at the last moment, Madison
refused to deliver his commission to Marbury when President Adams’ term as President ended.
As Chief Justice John Marshall defined the issue, the Court needed to answer three fundamental
questions, “1. Whether the Supreme Court can award the writ of mandamus in any case. 2.
Whether it will lie to a Secretary of State, in any case whatever. 3. Whether, in the present case,
the Court may award a mandamus to James Madison, Secretary of State.”16
In Marshall’s lengthy opinion, he systematically worked through each of these three
questions. With respect to the first, Marshall concluded that Marbury had a right to the
commission and the approval by the Senate and the signing of the commission by President
Adams indicated that Marbury had been legally appointed a Justice of the Peace. The delivery of
the document was not relevant to its validity. Second, because Marbury was entitled to the
commission, the law must afford him some kind of remedy. Third, Marshall ruled that the Court
could not grant the writ of mandamus because Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that give
the Court the power to afford this writ was, itself, unconstitutional. It invalidly expanded the
cases that could be considered within the “original jurisdiction” of the Supreme Court, or the
ability to bring cases directly to the Supreme Court. Congress did not have the power to extend
the Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what was written in the Constitution. Marshall explains,
16

Marbury v. Madison, Pg. 5 U.S. 137, 139, (1803).
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In the distribution of this power it is declared that, “The Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme
Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” It has been insisted at the bar, that, as the
original grant of jurisdiction to the Supreme and inferior courts is general, and the
clause assigning original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court contains no negative
or restrictive words, the power remains to the Legislature to assign original
jurisdiction to that Court in other cases than those specified in the article which
has been recited, provided those cases belong to the judicial power of the United
States.17
As evidenced by the careful language of his decision, Marshall demonstrates that he
understands he must strike a balance, writing an opinion that will be followed by the Executive
branch and maintain the authority of the Supreme Court to issue meaningful decisions. He also
wants to make it clear to President Jefferson who ordered then-Secretary of State Madison to
withhold the delivery of the commission, that Marbury had a right to the commission and had
been legally appointed by President Adams. Marshall explains that the transmission of the
commission to Marbury would have been simply a formality and that the appointment was
completed when President Adams signed the commission. Chief Justice Marshall finds an
interesting middle ground that both recognizes the right of Marbury to the commission, but also
the lack of authority of the Court to provide him the remedy that he demanded—the writ of
mandamus forcing President Jefferson to facilitate the delivery of the commission. In a very
clever way, Marshall manages to reinforce the right of the individual and the need for him to
receive a remedy from the Judiciary, while simultaneously concluding that the case should have
come to the Court through appellate jurisdiction, preventing the Court from providing him the
remedy that he sought.
Chief Justice John Marshall focuses on questions of power in his opinion. He applies his
understanding of the distribution of government power to the facts of the case. Through this
17

Ibid, Pg. 5 U.S. 137, 174.
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opinion, Marshall examines both the power of the President to make such judicial appointments
with the approval of the Senate and the power for the Supreme Court to hear the case and
provide a remedy to the injured party. Marshall understands the Constitution to provide the
framework for the allocation of power among the different branches of government. Through his
opinion, Marshall demonstrates his reverence for the strict separation of powers and deciding
cases involving the tension of powers through the lens of the Constitution.
When an instrument organizing fundamentally a judicial system divides it into
one Supreme and so many inferior courts as the Legislature may ordain and
establish, then enumerates its powers, and proceeds so far to distribute them as to
define the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by declaring the cases in which it
shall take original jurisdiction, and that in others it shall take appellate
jurisdiction, the plain import of the words seems to be that, in one class of cases,
its jurisdiction is original, and not appellate; in the other, it is appellate, and not
original. If any other construction would render the clause inoperative, that is an
additional reason for rejecting such other construction, and for adhering to the
obvious meaning.18
It is in his answer to the third question that Chief Justice Marshall addresses the Court’s
power of judicial review and greatly expands the extent of that power. By declaring Section 13
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 an inappropriate use of Congressional power to change the type of
cases falling within original jurisdiction of the Court, Marshall took the opportunity to assert
that, if a case presents a law that is directly in conflict with the Constitution, it is duty of the
justices to deem the law void. In his reasoning, a void law cannot not be enforced by the Courts
because it undermines the sanctity of the Constitution as a governing document.19
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation that, in declaring what shall be the
supreme law of the land, the Constitution itself is first mentioned, and not the
laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in
pursuance of the Constitution, have that rank. Thus, the particular phraseology of
the Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle,
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supposed to be essential to all written Constitutions, that a law repugnant to the
Constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by
that instrument.20
Through this landmark announcement, Chief Justice Marshall officially sanctified the
power of judicial review—the Supreme Court’s ability to strike down pieces of legislation
enacted by another branch that they understand to contradict provisions of the Constitution. By
formalizing the assignment of this power to the Judiciary, Marshall dramatically expands the
judicial power and makes it more nearly equal to the other two branches of government.
Marshall states,
It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity,
expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Courts
must decide on the operation of each. So, if a law be in opposition to the
Constitution, if both the law and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so that
the Court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the
Constitution, or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law, the Court
must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the
very essence of judicial duty. 21 (Emphasis in original)
The opinion of the Court in Marbury v. Madison (1803) represents a turning point for the
Supreme Court and redefines its role in society. Marshall not only resolves the issues by
declaring that a specific provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 is void, but he continues and
clarifies the powers of the Judiciary through commentary on the government structure in the
United States:
The Government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government
of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation if
the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right. If this obloquy
is to be cast on the jurisprudence of our country, it must arise from the peculiar
character of the case.22 (Emphasis in original)
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Boudin dedicates an entire chapter of Government By Judiciary to analyzing the Marbury
v. Madison (1803) decision and its impact on the Judiciary through the time he was writing in the
early 1930’s. Boudin ultimately concludes that U.S. government no longer resembles Marshall’s
government of laws, but instead has become a government of men. Dismayed, Boudin
continues, “A careful examination of the actual course of decision will show that ours is not
merely a Government of Men, but a Government of Conservative Men. And since the actual
power of government is in the hands of a majority of the United States Supreme Court, our
government could very well be termed ‘Government by a Few Conservative Men.’”23
Although, Boudin agrees with the fact that Marshall’s decision was an integral step in the
development of the judicial branch, he does not praise the opinion as many of his contemporaries
do. He finds many flaws with Chief Justice Marshall’s line of argument and characterizes it as
extremely weak in places.
First, Boudin points to a lack of precedent for a decision that so greatly expanded judicial
power through the Constitutional interpretation of the validity of laws. He wrote, “It must be
borne in mind that no question of the constitutionality of any act of Congress had been raised up
to the time of the actual delivery of the opinion and the decision of the case”24 (Emphasis in
original). At a time when the Judiciary was not in the forefront of the minds of the people,
Boudin points out that this was a high-profile case highlighting the partisan divide between
Federalists and Anti-Federalists.25 Marshall’s opinion, though, was unexpected by all. This was
especially true because Marshall did not decide the case in its natural order and in the order in
which Marbury’s attorney argued it. If he had, Marshall still would have been able to establish
the power of judicial review and strike down Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. But
23
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because he would have announced that the Court could not rule on the case due to the fact that
Section 13 was null and void, he would not have been able to assert Marbury’s right to the
commission. By changing the order in which the questions were answered, Marshall was able to
assert the Judiciary’s ability to order the Executive to deliver the commission to Marbury and to
indirectly lecture President Jefferson for attempting to interfere with this process.26 As a result,
Boudin concludes that,
But not only is Marshall’s opinion devoid of any foundation because his basic
inferences are historically untrue, but it is vulnerable even when tested by his own
favorite logical method. Outside of the unwarranted assumption and inferences
made by him, Marshall’s opinion on this point consists of only one argument: The
reductio ad absurdum. An attempt is made to reduce to absurdity the contrary
position, by a citation of a few provisions of the Constitution, followed by the
rhetorical query: What would happen to these provisions if the Legislature were
uncontrolled by the Judiciary?27 (Emphasis in original)
Boudin further criticizes two of Marshall’s major inferences as historically untrue. First,
Boudin points to Marshall’s assertion that, “all those who have framed written constitutions
contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and
consequently the theory of every such government must be that an act of the legislature repugnant
to the constitution is void” (Emphasis in original).28 Boudin points out that this statement was
simply false and that the French Constitution of 1791, for example, easily disproves this.
Looking at countries that rely on civil law, Boudin argues that Marshall’s argument that the
Judiciary must be the final arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution is debunked.29
Boudin also points out that Marshall makes no reference to the intention of the Framers,
though they had drafted the Constitution only two decades before prior this decision. One of
Marshall’s colleagues on the Supreme Court, Justice Paterson, had been an active member of the
26
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Constitutional Convention and could have easily attested to the intent of the other Framers.
Instead, Marshall writes, “And since the Constitution itself was silent on the subject and resort
had to be had to inferences in order to prove the intentions of the Framers, the utter failure to
refer to these intentions as stated by them is most curious, to say the least.”30 Boudin argues that
this statement suggests Marshall was not as confident as his opinion makes him appear that the
intentions of the Framers would support his assertion of the power of judicial review.
Despite these points of contention, Boudin does not argue that it is a careless or
thoughtless opinion. The decision in Marbury v. Madison (1803) is recognized as the landmark
decision that enabled the Court to strike down pieces of legislation as void. After a thorough
examination of the opinion itself, Boudin points out that nowhere in it does Marshall use the
word “unconstitutional.”31 As a result, Boudin chooses to interpret the meaning and impact of
this decision in a slightly different way than many later commentators. Boudin writes,
That position was this: That the Judiciary were not the special guardians of the
Constitution, appointed to that office by provisions of the Constitution itself. It
was not the “supreme authority” of the American system of government,
established by the United States Constitution. The Judiciary, therefore, had no
right to declare any law unconstitutional in the sense of nullifying that law or
destroying it. It was, however, one of three independent and co-ordinate
branches of the government, and as such it was not bound by the opinion of the
Legislature as to the meaning of the Constitution, and could decide the question
of constitutionality for itself; and having come to the conclusion that the law was
void for repugnance to he Constitution, disregard it in its own decisions. 32
(Emphasis in original)
Boudin understands Marshall’s opinion to be one that established the Court as the arbiter
of issues of power allocation. Boudin believes from the language of Marshall’s opinion, that
Marshall interprets the role of the Court to be an evaluation mechanism concerning the
constitutionality of laws on their rational basis as opposed to on the substance of individual
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statutes. Evaluation based on substance allows the Court to make direct policy through its
decisions. Boudin asserts, “But when constitutionality ceased to be the question of power which
it was under Marshall and his immediate successors, and became a question of reasonableness of
the use of an admitted power, the written constitution which was the source as well as the
measure of the Judicial Power under the Marshall theory of constitutional government was
thrown overboard” (Emphasis in original).33 Boudin concludes that there is considerable
difference between deciding whether legislation has a “rational basis” and deciding whether it is
“reasonable.”
Boudin also evaluates the impact of this decision on the greater sweep of judicial history
that he addresses in his work. He recognizes the major importance of this decision, but stops
there, refusing define Marbury as the predominant pivot point in the course of judicial history.
He argues that many historians define judicial history as pre- and post- Marbury v. Madison
(1803) and that does not accurately understand the effect of subsequent decisions handed down
by the Court.
The official tradition with respect to Marbury v. Madison divides the history of
the Judicial Power in the United States into two unequal epochs: The short period
between the adoption of the United States Constitution and Marbury v. Madison,
which is represented as a sort of preliminary or testing period; and the postMarbury period, which is supposed to be a uniform development of our judicial
history under the aegis of John Marshall and his successors in office, lighted by
the torch of that great opinion.34
Boudin acknowledges the importance of Marbury v. Madison (1803), but does not view
Marshall’s decision as the singular turning point in constitutional law. “With such a view of
history of the Judicial Power, turning points in that history are extremely awkward to deal with;
so they had best be overlooked. And overlooked they were. In fact, they still are being
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overlooked, to the great detriment of a real understanding of our history.”35 The other turning
points he identifies include, but are not limited to, Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), Lochner v.
New York (1905), and a number of decisions occurring in the years before the Great Depression.
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CHAPTER 3:
Dred Scott v. Sandford
When the Supreme Court agreed to hear Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), it was clear that
the justices were prepared to make their first ruling directly addressing the question of the
constitutionality of slavery in America. Slavery had been a contentious issue even before the
ratification of the Constitution, creating many roadblocks for the Framers as they attempted to
create a governing document acceptable to all. As a compromise, the Framers chose not to
directly address the issue. In 1857, in a 7-2 decision, the Court found that because Dred Scott
was a slave, he was not a citizen of the United States and therefore did not have standing to bring
a case to court. Chief Justice Taney, who authored the opinion of the Court, also declared that
the federal government could not regulate slavery in the territories added to the union after the
ratification of the Constitution. This rendered the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional. Dred
Scott v. Sandford (1857) was the first time since Marbury v. Madison (1803) fifty years earlier
that the Court had declared an act of Congress unconstitutional.36
Dred Scott was a slave living in Missouri, a slave state. Scotts’ owner took him across
state lines to two free states, first Illinois and then Minnesota, and then returned to Missouri with
Scott. After these travels, Scott’s owner attempted to sell him to the respondent, Mr. Sandford.
Scott chose to file a suit in court to regain the free status he claimed he had obtained by traveling
to and residing in the two free states with his previous owner. The lower court agreed with Dred
Scott but the decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed the lower court’s
ruling granting Mr. Scott his freedom. It was clear from the language of Chief Justice Taney’s
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opinion that he intended to resolve the issue of slavery dividing the nation once and for all. But
his politically charged opinion only helped spark the Civil War four years later in 1861.
Chief Justice Taney writes a long decision to answer one central question:
The question is simply this: can a negro whose ancestors were imported into this
country and sold as slaves become a member of the political community formed
and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such
become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied by
that instrument to the citizen, one of which rights is the privilege of suing in a
court of the United States in the cases specified in the Constitution?37
Taney used both historical experience and the intent of the Framers to assess whether
“Negroes” could be “citizens” of the United States as he deems all white males to be. He
repeatedly distinguished “Negroes” from other “races,” especially Native Americans. Though
Native Americans had not officially participated in colonial America, they had their own
freedom, independence and an established governing order as a people. Therefore, they retained
the ability to participate in the governing structure of the United States. In contrast, “Negroes”
never attained this level of civil freedom and had always been considered property to be bought
and sold, even in other nations.
Chief Justice Taney spends nearly half of his opinion defining the meaning of the words
“citizen” and “people” as used in the Constitution by the Framers. He digs through historical
evidence looking back to the British participation in slave trade prior to, and during, the
settlement of the colonies. This was the only type of interaction that took place between the
British and people of African descent. Taney extends this thinking to the Framers, many of
whom were one and the same. Chief Justice Taney argues that the Framers had never considered
“Negroes” to be anything but property and would not have included them in their definition of a
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citizen who could actively participate in the government. He looks back to the Declaration of
Independence for proof of the Framers’ intentions:
“We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among them is
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, Governments
are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.” The
general words above quoted would seem to embrace the whole human family, and
if they were used in a similar instrument at this day would be so understood. But
it is too clear for dispute that the enslaved African race were not intended to be
included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this
declaration, for if the language, as understood in that day, would embrace them,
the conduct of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of
Independence would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the
principles they asserted, and instead of the sympathy of mankind to which they so
confidently appealed, they would have deserved and received universal rebuke
and reprobation.38
Weakening Taney’s argument is the fact that some of the information he cites in support
of his argument was not entirely true. For example, Taney refers to the fact that “Negroes” were
not included in those people who framed and adopted the Constitution. In a few states, such as
Massachusetts, they were in fact allowed to vote on the ratification of the Constitution.
Regardless, Taney continues to search through many of the major documents that outlined the
government of the United States to reinforce his argument. He identifies two Constitutional
provisions that include some mention of slavery and explains how they help to further prove his
point. The first Constitutional provision reserves the right of each of the thirteen original states
to import slaves until 1808 if each state considers it “proper.” 39 The second provision requires
the states to respect the property rights of the master and compels other states to return any
escaped slaves.40 Chief Justice Taney supports these points with in depth analysis of the nature
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of state slavery laws, including in northern states such as Massachusetts and Connecticut.41
Chief Justice Taney concludes that he has proved beyond a doubt that the term “citizen” used by
the Framers had not been intended to include “Negroes.”
What the construction was at that time we think can hardly admit of doubt. We
have the language of the Declaration of Independence and of the Articles of
Confederation, in addition to the plain words of the Constitution itself; we have
the legislation of the different States, before, about the time, and since the
Constitution was adopted; we have the legislation of Congress, from the time of
its adoption to a recent period; and we have the constant and uniform action of the
Executive Department, all concurring together, and leading to the same result.
And if anything in relation to the construction of the Constitution can be regarded
as settled, it is that which we now give to the word “citizen” and the word
“people.”42
He bolsters the impact of his decision by recognizing the animosity surrounding the issue
of slavery. But he points out that the justices cannot be swayed by public opinion and must
make a decision based on the Constitution. He recognizes it as the Court’s duty to interpret the
Constitution through the language used and in his analysis he finds that policy-making is a
responsibility of the Legislature and not that of the Judiciary. Therefore, Chief Justice Taney
comments,
It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy
or impolicy, of these laws. The decision of that question belonged to the political
or lawmaking power, to those who formed the sovereignty and framed the
Constitution. The duty of the court is to interpret the instrument they have framed
with the best lights we can obtain on the subject, and to administer it as we find it,
according to its true intent and meaning when it was adopted.43
He later continues,
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling, in
relation to this unfortunate race, in the civilized nations of Europe or in this
country, should induce the court to give to the words of the Constitution a more
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liberal construction in their favor than they were intended to bear when the
instrument was framed and adopted. Such an argument would be altogether
inadmissible in any tribunal called on to interpret it. 44
Taney seems quite confident in his final definition of a “citizen” of the United States and
he specifically asserts that, with careful historical examination, he would be able to determine the
status of any group of people as citizens and contributing members of society.
The words “people of the United States” and “citizens” are synonymous terms,
and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to
our republican institutions, form the sovereignty and who hold the power and
conduct the Government through their representatives. They are what we
familiarly call the “sovereign people,” and every citizen is one of this people, and
a constituent member of this sovereignty. The question before us is whether the
class of persons described in the plea in abatement compose a portion of this
people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they are not,
and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the
word “citizens” in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and
privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United
States. 45
The natural limit of Chief Justice Taney’s can be seen in his determination that Scott did
not have the right to bring the case in front of the Court since he was not a citizen. Taney
continues, though, to judge the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise. He declares that
Congress does not have the power to ban slavery in specific U.S. Territories as the Missouri
Compromise attempts to do. He cites the Fifth Amendment as a safeguard against the seizure of
personal property by Congress without proper and equivocal compensation. Scott’s travel and
residence into a “free territory” did not make him free because the Missouri Compromise is void
and an abuse of Congress’s power.
Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the court that the act of Congress
which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of this kind in the
territory of the United States north of the line therein mentioned is not warranted
by the Constitution, and is therefore void, and that neither Dred Scott himself nor
any of his family were made free by being carried into this territory, even if they
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had been carried there by the owner with the intention of becoming a permanent
resident.46
Based on the language of the Constitution, Taney finds only a few provisions that
reference slavery, none that forbid it, and nothing that creates special powers to differentiate
between different kinds of property. He concludes that Congress did not have the authority to
limit the ability of citizens to own property in specific territories:
The powers of the Government and the rights of the citizen under it are positive
and practical regulations plainly written down. The people of the United States
have delegated to it certain enumerated powers and forbidden it to exercise others.
It has no power over the person or property of a citizen but what the citizens of
the United States have granted. And no laws or usages of other nations, or
reasoning of statesmen or jurists upon the relations of master and slave, can
enlarge the powers of the Government or take from the citizens the rights they
have reserved. And if the Constitution recognizes the right of property of the
master in a slave, and makes no distinction between that description of property
and other property owned by a citizen, no tribunal, acting under the authority of
the United States, whether it be legislative, executive, or judicial, has a right to
draw such a distinction or deny to it the benefit of the provisions and guarantees
which have been provided for the protection of private property against the
encroachments of the Government.47
Chief Justice Taney is keenly aware of the impact that his decision will have on the
nation, especially one as divided over slavery as the United States was at the time. Knowing
this, he explains his understanding of the role of the judiciary in the federal government and the
implication of his decisions based on this defined role. Taney writes about the duty of the
Judiciary to recognize the binding provisions of the Constitution and that the Constitution does
not expressly give the power to Congress to make laws limiting slaves as property in certain
territories. He concludes that the Judiciary cannot support Congress’s attempt to do so through
the enactment of the Missouri Compromise:
It is a question for the political department of the Government, and not the
judicial, and whatever the political department of the Government shall recognize
46
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as within the limits of the United States, the judicial department is also bound to
recognize and to administer in it the laws of the United States so far as they apply,
and to maintain in the Territory the authority and rights of the Government and
also the personal rights and rights of property of individual citizens as secured by
the Constitution. All we mean to say on this point is that, as there is no express
regulation in the Constitution defining the power which the General Government
may exercise over the person or property of a citizen in a Territory thus acquired,
the court must necessarily look to the provisions and principles of the Constitution
and its distribution of powers for the rules and principles by which its decision
must be governed.48
In his chapter analyzing the Dred Scott Case and Chief Justice Taney’s opinion, Boudin
voices his disappointment with the both the nature of arguments in the opinion and the
implications they have for the future of the nation. The Missouri Compromise was only the
second piece of Congressional legislation to be struck down by the Court, and Boudin compares
the two cases that brought about this result and differentiates between them. Outraged, Boudin
writes,
The Dred Scott decision is the very foundation of our constitutional system as it
exists today.
Popular belief and professional opinion to the contrary
notwithstanding, Taney, not Marshall, is the Father of the Judicial Power. And its
foundations were laid not in Marbury v. Madison (1803) but in Dred Scott v.
Sandford (1857). Marshall was at most a pretender to the throne, while Taney
established a real kingdom. But even Marshall’s pretentions did not extend to the
vast domain which Taney actually conquered. In Marbury v. Madison Marshall
put forward the comparatively modest claim that in passing upon the right of Mr.
Marbury to be Justice of the Peace of the District of Columbia during the next few
years, the judges had the right to compare the law of Congress with the
Constitution on the question of power of the Supreme Court to issue a writ of
mandamus, and, if they found that the law of Congress was not in accordance
with what they believed to be the provisions of the Constitution, to disregard the
law of Congress. But in the Dred Scot Case, Taney and his associates undertook,
in the language of Mr. Justice Wayne, to settle by judicial decision the peace and
harmony of the country.49 (Emphasis in original)
From this decision by the Court, Boudin concludes that the constitutional system, upon
which the Federal government is based, was completely and fundamentally redefined by Chief

48

Ibid, Pg. 60 U.S. 393, 447.
Boudin, op. cit., Vol. 2, 2.

49

33

Justice Taney. In the process, he reformulates the power balance of the three branches and
upsets the strict separation of powers. Boudin identifies this as one of the most major shifts in
constitutional theory up to that time by the Court. Boudin accuses Taney of trying to resolve a
fundamental policy question—slavery—for the nation through a judicial decision. By striking
down of the Missouri Compromise as unconstitutional, Chief Justice Taney and his six proslavery colleagues advance their own preference on a policy matter. Boudin charges,
The declaration of the Missouri Compromise Act unconstitutional was therefore
clearly a sheer act of usurpation of political power even under the official and
orthodox doctrine of judicial review. Thus we come to the conclusion that the
very first time when the United States Supreme Court actually used its power to
declare a law of Congress unconstitutional in a manner to make a difference to the
people of the United States, it did so by a sheer act of usurpation even according
to the official and orthodox theory of judicial review as expounded by its official
interpreters. And this is more than merely an interesting historical fact. It exhibits
the true nature of the power—its dangerous character as a political institution.50
(Emphasis in original)
Boudin argues that this abuse of the judicial power creates the real potential for this
branch to function unchecked by the others, having the capacity, as a result, to destroy the entire
fabric of America’s constitutional democracy. A decision like the Dred Scott Case demonstrates
for Boudin how detrimental and dangerous the Judiciary has the potential to become. Chief
Justice Taney and his colleagues striking down a law as unconstitutional in order to create policy
for the nation and to settle “peace and harmony” in the country, Boudin argues, is a flagrantly
inappropriate use of the judicial power by the justices.
Boudin is more concerned with the implications this opinion has on the relationship
between the branches of government than he is with the specific facts of the case. Despite this,
he does address slavery as a policy issue, sarcastically commenting about the evidence that Chief
Justice Taney presented about “Negroes” and his definition of the term “citizen.” For example,
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he mentions, “The point of his argument was that Negroes were considered so degraded a race
that the Constitution could not possibly have meant them to be included in the word ‘citizens,’
when it provided that a citizen may sue in the Federal courts.”51 Boudin strives to educate his
readers about the implications of judicial power this case raises because he feels that Taney’s
opinion received attention mostly for its resolution—even if temporary—of the issue of slavery.
Boudin identifies a different, and greater, problem with it. “But the general criticism was
directed to the attempted settlement of the Slavery question, rather than to the change in our
constitutional system which was involved…The attempted disposition of the Slavery question
made in the Dred Scott Case endangered the entire existence of the Union under the
Constitution.”52
Boudin focuses his analysis more centrally on the fact that after the Court granted itself
the power to make fundamental policy decisions for the nation, only the Court possessed the
power to check itself or place limits on its own power. He explained,
The Union had been preserved without slavery, notwithstanding, the Dred Scott
decision. But it has been preserved Chief Justice Taney’s decision as to the
Supremacy of the Judicial Power. This statement may come as a shock to those
who were brought up on our standards of histories, all of which assure us that the
Dred Scott decision had been overruled “on the field of battle” “by force of
arms.” But “arms” are of as little importance as are “men,” in our theory of
government, unless, of course, the ‘men’ happen to be judges, particularly judges
of the United States Supreme Court. A decision of the U.S. Supreme Court can,
therefore, be overruled only by the court itself, or by special amendment to the
Constitution. And even constitutional amendments are effective only in so far as
the U.S. Supreme Court approves them.53 (Emphasis in original)
Boudin expands on the point that the Judiciary negates any incentive for the justices to
bind themselves to the Constitution aside from their own personal beliefs about the power and
functioning of the Judiciary. Any accountability measure built into the structure of the
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government and applied to the judicial branch is destroyed by the striking down of the Missouri
Compromise as the Court tries to resolve a national policy issue that was not its to decide in the
first place. Boudin argues that the power that the justices have given themselves as a result of
the Dred Scott case is absolute and a constitutional amendment cannot even truly limit it: 54
For, once you admit that the power exists, there is no limit upon it except the will
of those who wield it. And no one who reads the Dred Scott Case can have the
hardihood to say that those who wield this power are seriously bound by the true
meaning of the Constitution, or even by their own expressed views of the
Constitution, or of their own powers thereunder. It is this that is our excuse for
considering this case at such great length. It was not merely a wrong decision. It
was a revolution.55
In his analysis, Boudin takes issue with the fact that Chief Justice Taney did not address
the questions involved in the case in the natural order that they occurred, enabling him to
produce a more expansive opinion. Boudin asserts, “The real reason for Chief Justice Taney’s
departing from the natural and logical order of the case was that that course would have
prevented him from discussing the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise Act and that
was his chief purpose in the second decision” (Emphasis in original).56 Boudin argues that
Taney used Dred Scott to further his primary interest of striking down the Missouri Compromise
and allowing the continued institution of slavery in newly acquired territories. This could not
have been achieved if Taney decided the case in its natural order.. Boudin elaborates,
Not only the logic of the case, but the economy of the argument demanded that
the effect of Scott’s sojourn in Illinois should be considered first. And Chief
Justice Taney practically confesses that he was not doing the proper thing in
departing from the natural order of the case, by the excuse which he gives for
doing so. He says that he wanted to consider first the question of the freedom of
Scott and his family, and then, if he should decide against the freedom of the rest
of the family, he would consider whether Scott himself was free. But this was
clearly subterfuge. For as a matter of fact the ground upon which he finally
disposed of the question of Scott’s sojourn in Illinois—namely, that upon his
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return to Missouri he lost the benefit of whatever freedom he may have acquired
in free territory, disposed of the whole case, and the very elaborate discussion of
the entire question of the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise Act
became superfluous. 57 (Emphasis in original)
Boudin believes that ideally a restrained Supreme Court would have come to a very
different decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857). Boudin looks to John Davis, the President
of the American Bar Association in 1929 for his conception and definition of the judicial power
to contrast that of Taney. Boudin quotes Davis stating,
We have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the grounds
that they are unconstitutional. That question may be considered only where the
justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justifiable
issue, is made to rest upon such an act. Then the power exercised is that of
ascertaining and declaring the law applicable to the controversy. It amounts to
little more than the negative power to disregard an unconstitutional enactment,
which otherwise would stand in the way of the enforcement of a legal right.58
(Emphasis in original)
Using Davis’s statement to guide his analysis, Boudin argues that Chief Justice Taney should not
have strayed beyond identifying Scott’s status as a slave or a free man. Addressing the
constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise is both an overextension and misunderstanding of
the nature of the judicial power. Furthermore, policy after the fact focuses on slavery and
ignores the fundamental change in judicial power brought about by Taney:
As to the constitutional amendments—the so-called “war amendments”—it is
clear that whatever they may have done to the particular problem involved in the
Dred Scott decision, the problem of Slavery, they certainly did not touch the
general constitutional change effected by that decision—that of the Supreme
Court arrogating to itself, and thereby to every other court in the land, the right to
settle by judicial decision the peace and harmony of the country, i.e. raising the
Judiciary to a position of supreme political power.59 (Emphasis in original)

57

Ibid, 19-20.
Ibid, 20-21.
59
Ibid, 3.
58

37

CHAPTER 4:
Lochner v. New York
Louis Boudin began to study law and develop his own constitutional philosophy at the
same time that James Thayer published his most significant works. Boudin was heavily
influenced by Thayer’s lectures and writings. Simultaneously, the Supreme Court was beginning
to address contentious economic issues emerging from the Industrial Revolution and the
technological advances that accompanied it. The Court was asked to begin to parse out the limits
imposed on the powers of the individual State governments to dictate and control their own
economies. When drafting the Constitution, the Framers provided Congress with the power to
regulate “interstate commerce” (in addition to international trade).
This distinction between the national and state economies did not pose problems from the
time of the ratification of the Constitution through the nineteenth century because a majority of
the states’ economies were based on agriculture and consequently largely local. At the
beginning in the twentieth century, following the Industrial Revolution, the national economy
began rapidly expanding and technological developments enabled new types of commerce to
emerge. These advances allowed for perishable goods to be stored more efficiently and shipped
over greater distances, blurring the distinction between the domains of the states versus the
federal government. As the national economy expanded, more commerce was “interstate” and
fell within Congress’s power to regulate.
The beginning of the twentieth century brought this issue of power between the federal
and state governments to a head. The stark differences in constitutional philosophies among the
justices on the Court and the partisan nature of economic policy questions were highlighted. At
the time, conservatives highly valued the strength of contracts and the importance of the free
market with little interference from the Federal government. The ability of the individual to
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function freely and independently in the marketplace was central to conservatives. Liberals, on
the other hand, tended to place value on the rights of the states to make decisions and create
policies deemed to be in the best interest of their populace. A case that highlights this
fundamental split on the Court is Lochner v. New York (1905).
Lochner v. New York (1905) involved the constitutionality of a New York State statute
that limited the working hours of bakers. The state argued that it was acting within its “police
powers” to regulate the welfare of its constituents. Counsel for Lochner, the owner of the bakery
that violated the statute, argued that the law restricted the right of individuals to freely enter into
contracts and therefore violated the contract clause of the U.S. Constitution. The contract clause
reads:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold
and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post
facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of
Nobility.60 (Emphasis added)
Justice Rufus Peckham—joined in a five-to-four decision by Justices Fuller, Brewer,
Brown, and McKenna—asserts that limiting the number of hours bakers can work is not a
permissible use of the state’s police power. Peckham identifies the key legal issue in the case to
be a question of which right takes precedent: the right of the state to take an interest in public
health and pass legislation regulating related industries, or the individual’s right to enter into
contracts freely without interference from the government. Framing the legal issue, he writes,
Therefore, when the State, by its legislature, in the assumed exercise of its police
powers, has passed an act which seriously limits the right to labor or the right of
contract in regard to their means of livelihood between persons who are sui juris
(both employer and employee), it becomes of great importance to determine
which shall prevail—the right of the individual to labor for such time as he may
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choose or the right of the State to prevent the individual from laboring or from
entering into any contract to labor beyond a certain time prescribed by the State.61
Justice Peckham considers whether the use of the police power was “fair, reasonable, and
appropriate” 62 or “unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary.” 63
In every case that comes before this court, therefore, where legislation of this
character is concerned and where the protection of the Federal Constitution is
sought, the question necessarily arises: is this a fair, reasonable and appropriate
exercise of the police power of the State, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary and
arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty or to
enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him appropriate
or necessary for the support of himself and his family? Of course, the liberty of
contract relating to labor includes both parties to it. The one has as much right to
purchase as the other to sell labor.64
Justice Peckham introduces a fundamentally new constitutional philosophy to the
Judiciary that involves evaluating the constitutionality of legislation based on its perceived
reasonableness. Applying the new standard he writes,
The question whether this act is valid as a labor law, pure and simple, may be
dismissed in a few words. There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the
liberty of person or the right of free contract by determining the hours of labor in
the occupation of a baker. There is no contention that bakers as a class are not
equal in intelligence and capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations, or
that they are able to assert their rights and care for themselves without the
protecting arm of the State, interfering with their independence of judgment and
of action.65
Justice Peckham explains that the connection between baking hours and public health is
not strong enough to warrant state regulation of the industry and curtailing the individual’s right
to freely contract his labor. He finds that working conditions in many other occupations pose
much greater risk to public health than those in baking. He also points out that if the state could
limit the working hours of bakers, there would be no limit to what it could regulate:
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It might be safely affirmed that almost all occupations more or less affect the
health. There must be more than the mere fact of the possible existence of some
small amount of unhealthiness to warrant legislative interference with liberty. It is
unfortunately true that labor, even in any department, may possibly carry with it
the seeds of unhealthiness. But are we all, on that account, at the mercy of
legislative majorities?…No trade, no occupation, no mode of earning one's living
could escape this all-pervading power, and the acts of the legislature in limiting
the hours of labor in all employments would be valid although such limitation
might seriously cripple the ability of the laborer to support himself and his
family.66
Justice Peckham warns about the ever-expanding powers of the state. He asserts that the
state inappropriately invoked its police powers in this case and that it should not have interfered
with the rights of the individual to freely contract. Justice Peckham and his conservative
colleagues argue that the Court cannot tolerate such an abrogation of rights and notes that the
Court will not hesitate to strike down this kind of economic policy legislation. Justice Peckham
points out in his opinion that the state is attempting to limit the ability of “grown and intelligent
men” 67 to create and voluntarily enter into contracts.
The act is not, within any fair meaning of the term, a health law, but is an illegal
interference with the rights of individuals, both employers and employees, to
make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as they may think best, or which
they may agree upon with the other parties to such contracts. Statutes of the
nature of that under review, limiting the hours in which grown and intelligent men
may labor to earn their living, are mere meddlesome interferences with the rights
of the individual, and they are not saved from condemnation by the claim that
they are passed in the exercise of the police power and upon the subject of the
health of the individual whose rights are interfered with, unless there be some fair
ground, reasonable in and of itself, to say that there is material danger to the
public health or to the health of the employees if the hours of labor are not
curtailed.68
Peckham argues that the Court has a duty to inquire into the real purposes of legislatures.
He is suspicious of the motives of the New York State legislature in enacting the legislation at
issue:
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It is impossible for us to shut our eyes to the fact that many of the laws of this
character, while passed under what is claimed to be the police power for the
purpose of protecting the public health or welfare, are, in reality, passed from
other motives. We are justified in saying so when, from the character of the law
and the subject upon which it legislates, it is apparent that the public health or
welfare bears but the most remote relation to the law. The purpose of a statute
must be determined from the natural and legal effect of the language employed,
and whether it is or is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States must
be determined from the natural effect of such statutes when put into operation,
and not from their proclaimed purpose.69
Questions of economic policy were highly contentious and partisan at the turn of the
twentieth century. In the decision in Lochner, Justice Peckham and his one vote majority
demonstrate precisely how they believe economic policy should be modeled in America. They
highly value limited interference by state and federal governments and a free market in which
individuals can voluntarily create contracts with one another.
Many liberals, including Boudin, were outraged by the activism of the Court displayed.
They believe that the states should be free to enact policies in the best interest of their citizens.
Justices Harlan and Holmes each authored a dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York (1905)
questioning the new constitutional philosophy put forward by Peckham and urging deference to
the legislative process in the states.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan, joined by both Justices White and Day, voices
his grave concern with Justice Peckham’s opinion. Justice Harlan points out that it does not
matter how wise or unwise the substance of the legislation; the Court’s role is simply to
determine the power to legislate rather than pass judgment on the merits of the legislation. He
accuses Justice Peckham of losing sight of this fact. Justice Harlan writes,
If there be doubt as to the validity of the statute, that doubt must therefore be
resolved in favor of its validity, and the courts must keep their hands off, leaving
the legislature to meet the responsibility for unwise legislation. If the end which
the legislature seeks to accomplish be one to which its power extends, and if the
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means employed to that end, although not the wisest or best, are yet not plainly
and palpably unauthorized by law, then the court cannot interfere. In other words,
when the validity of a statute is questioned, the burden of proof, so to speak, is
upon those who assert it to be unconstitutional.70
Both Justices Peckham and Harlan point to Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1896) as precedent that
should be applied to Lochner v. New York (1905). This case, decided only nine years prior to
Lochner, concerned a Louisiana statute that prohibited out-of-state insurance companies from
conducting business within the state of Louisiana. State officials asserted that this was an
appropriate exercise of the police power. Allgeyer and Company was an insurance company that
conducted business in Louisiana in violation of the statute. The Court found that the Louisiana
statute was an inappropriate exercise of the police power of the state violating its citizens’ liberty
to create and enter into contracts and Allgeyer and Company’s right to conduct business within
the state if they so choose. Justice Peckham writes,
The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the
liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution. Allgeyer v. Louisiana 165 U. S. 578. Under that provision, no State
can deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The
right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment
unless there are circumstances which exclude the right.71
Justice Harlan points out that the Court’s opinion in Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1896)
explicitly acknowledges the right of the state to regulate contracts:
Speaking generally, the State, in the exercise of its powers, may not unduly
interfere with the right of the citizen to enter into contracts that may be necessary
and essential in the enjoyment of the inherent rights belonging to everyone,
among which rights is the right “to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to
be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation. This was
declared in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 165 U. S. 589. But, in the same
case, it was conceded that the right to contract in relation to persons and property
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or to do business within a State may be “regulated, and sometimes prohibited,
when the contracts or business conflict with the policy of the State as contained in
its statutes.” (P. 165 U. S. 591).72 (Emphasis added)
Justice Harlan expresses a constitutional philosophy very different from that of Justice
Peckham. Harlan argues that the Court is not empowered to strike down legislation merely
because justices believe it is unreasonable. Justice Harlan asserts that the Court should only
strike down legislation as unconstitutional when the State has misused its power. Upon
evaluation of the facts of the case, Harlan understands the majority of the Court to have
overstepped its power to strike down a state statute, doing so based on its content and in order to
shape economic policy.
Granting then that there is a liberty of contract which cannot be violated even
under the sanction of direct legislative enactment, but assuming, as according to
settled law we may assume, that such liberty of contract is subject to such
regulations as the State may reasonably prescribe for the common good and the
wellbeing of society, what are the conditions under which the judiciary may
declare such regulations to be in excess of legislative authority and void? Upon
this point there is no room for dispute, for the rule is universal that a legislative
enactment, Federal or state, is never to be disregarded or held invalid unless it be,
beyond question, plainly and palpably in excess of legislative power.73
Justice Harlan argues that the state must be able to operate without unnecessary
interference by the federal Judiciary. It is essential for the Judiciary to trust the state to act in
informed and intelligent ways with the well being of its population both in the short and long
term as a top priority. Because it is irrelevant whether the Court “trusts” or not, the question is
whether they have the power to act. The role of the Judiciary is to determine the legitimacy of
the state to legislate rather than how wise and reasonable any piece of legislation is in a practical
sense. Justice Harlan writes,
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We are not to presume that the State of New York has acted in bad faith. Nor can
we assume that its legislature acted without due deliberation, or that it did not
determine this question upon the fullest attainable information, and for the
common good. We cannot say that the State has acted without reason, nor ought
we to proceed upon the theory that its action is a mere sham. Our duty, I submit,
is to sustain the statute as not being in conflict with the Federal Constitution for
the reason—and such is an all-sufficient reason—it is not shown to be plainly and
palpably inconsistent with that instrument. Let the State alone in the management
of its purely domestic affairs so long as it does not appear beyond all question that
it has violated the Federal Constitution.74
Even if the Court could evaluate the statute based on the reasonableness of its content, the
state representatives must still be trusted to have an interest in protecting public health and to
understand the needs of their constituents. He continues,
It is plain that this statute was enacted in order to protect the physical wellbeing of
those who work in bakery and confectionery establishments. It may be that the
statute had its origin, in part, in the belief that employers and employees in such
establishments were not upon an equal footing, and that the necessities of the
latter often compelled them to submit to such exactions as unduly taxed their
strength. Be this as it may, the statute must be taken as expressing the belief of the
people of New York that, as a general rule, and in the case of the average man,
labor in excess of sixty hours during a week in such establishments may endanger
the health of those who thus labor. Whether or not this be wise legislation it is not
the province of the court to inquire. Under our systems of government, the courts
are not concerned with the wisdom or policy of legislation. So that, in
determining the question of power to interfere with liberty of contract, the court
may inquire whether the means devised by the State are germane to an end which
may be lawfully accomplished and have a real or substantial relation to the
protection of health, as involved in the daily work of the persons, male and
female, engaged in bakery and confectionery establishments. But when this
inquiry is entered upon, I find it impossible, in view of common experience, to
say that there is here no real or substantial relation between the means employed
by the State and the end sought to be accomplished by its legislation.75
Justice Holmes also authors a brief dissenting opinion and famously criticizes the way in
which Justice Peckham decided Lochner v. New York (1905). Justice Holmes argues that
Peckham’s opinion is based on economic policy not constitutional law. To Justice Holmes,
Peckham is making policy rather than answering a legal question concerning the power of the
74

Ibid, Pg. 198 U.S. 45, 73.
Ibid, Pg. 198 U.S. 45, 68.

75

45

state. Holmes writes, “This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the
country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I should
desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be
my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with
the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law.” 76
Justice Holmes argues that whether Justice Peckham and the majority agree or disagree
with the policy of New York State is irrelevant to the constitutional question. The Constitution
“is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain
opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment
upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United
States.”77
For Justice Holmes, the state was acting within its legitimate police powers to regulate
the public health of its citizens. The role of the Supreme Court is to determine the power to
legislate and not the reasonableness of a specific statute. “But a constitution is not intended to
embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the
citizen to the State or of laissez faire.”78 He writes, “It is settled by various decisions of this
court that state constitutions and state laws may regulate life in many ways which we, as
legislators, might think as injudicious, or, if you like, as tyrannical, as this, and which, equally
with this, interfere with the liberty to contract.” 79
In his brief opinion, Justice Holmes advocates the kind of judicial restraint that James
Thayer and Louis Boudin believe is essential to avoid the abuse of judicial power. He argues
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that the New York legislature is composed of elected officials who are reasonable men who
understand the needs of their constituents. These reasonable men have implemented a statute
that regulates the hours that bakers can work presumably in response to a valid public health
concern. Whether the legislation is wise or unwise, state legislators have the power to
implement it. Holmes believes Justice Peckham is distorting the relevant constitutional
provisions in order to promote his own opinion about economic policy:
Every opinion tends to become a law. I think that the word liberty in the
Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural
outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man
necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental
principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our
law. It does not need research to show that no such sweeping condemnation can
be passed upon the statute before us. A reasonable man might think it a proper
measure on the score of health. Men whom I certainly could not pronounce
unreasonable would uphold it as a first installment of a general regulation of the
hours of work. Whether in the latter aspect it would be open to the charge of
inequality I think it unnecessary to discuss.”80
The Lochner case took place as Louis Boudin’s own constitutional philosophy was being
evolved. Like Holmes, Boudin takes issue with the majority opinion. Though he praises Justice
Holmes’s dissent, he doesn’t think it goes far enough. Boudin thinks Holmes has failed to
acknowledge the novelty of the majority’s sweeping claim that it has the constitutional power to
evaluate the reasonableness of legislation. Boudin accuses Peckham of changing the established
role of the Court to completely reverse the requirements of those bringing the case to the
Supreme Court. Justice Peckham seems to acknowledge no duty to defer to democratically
elected legislatures and begins with the presumption that the state statute was unconstitutional
and thereby imposes a burden of proof on the state to prove its constitutionality.
But under the decision in the Lochner case the positions are reversed: We start
with the general proposition that restraints upon the liberty of contracts are
‘meddlesome interferences.’
The presumption is, therefore, against the
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constitutionality of all laws abridging the freedom of contract. And the burden of
proof is, therefore, upon those asserting the validity of the law to prove its
constitutionality, by proving, to the satisfaction of the court, the reasonableness of
the interference. And if this reasonableness be not clearly proved the law must be
declared unconstitutional.81
This is an entirely new concept that, while the Court had begun developing in earlier
economic policy cases, is fully asserted for the first time in Lochner v. New York (1905). Boudin
believes Peckham makes no attempt to evaluate the New York state legislature’s ability to pass
such a statute, but instead only looks to the content of the law and with his conservative majority,
strikes it down:
“It will be noted that Mr. Justice Peckham does not say that the provisions with
respect to the hours of work which the Court is here deciding unconstitutional,
would, or should, appear unreasonable to all intelligent men. Nor does he set up
any objective standard whereby such a question could be determined, or even
pretend that such a standard is necessary, or has been used. It is sufficient if the
Court, that is to say, a majority of its members, say so.”82
Boudin identifies that the Court’s transition into acting as a super-legislature (the greatest
threat he sees that the Judiciary poses against the people) is complete after the Lochner decision.
When justices become concerned with the reasonableness of statutes and the Judiciary assumes
the legislative function of creating policy, the Constitution becomes irrelevant. Boudin compares
the election process of selecting representatives to this new active role of the Judiciary. The way
the Judiciary is setting aside the Constitution is analogous to the people stepping aside to allow
their elected representatives to make policy decisions. Boudin argues that the main difference is
that elections formally allow the people to give their self-governing power to elected
representatives temporarily. The people will vote in future elections and reevaluate whether they
want the same representative to continue to serve them, either state or Federal. This cannot be
the case with the Judiciary and the Constitution. Boudin explains,
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Clearly the Constitution cannot umpire such a contest as that suggested by Mr.
Justice Peckham between the legislative power and individual rights, in which the
claims of each must be weighed and decided from time to time as the exigencies
of the contest may demand, under varying circumstances and conditions, with no
other rule than that of reasonableness, which notoriously is a matter of individual
judgment. The Constitution may appoint such umpires. And if we understand the
new theory of constitutionality, the Constitution has done so. But upon so doing
the Constitution must, like the electorate after an election, retire from the scene,
having abdicated the powers of sovereignty into the hands of its chosen
representatives. With this difference, however: The retirement of the electorate is
only temporary, and it can, therefore, exercise some control over its agents by
retiring them from public life and reversing their decisions whenever they should
be found unsatisfactory. But the Constitution cannot exercise such power. Nor
can anyone on its behalf. Its retirement from the scene is therefore both complete
and permanent, as our subsequent judicial history clearly demonstrates.83
Boudin understands Justice Peckham’s opinion to be an attempt to set the Constitution
aside and for the Judiciary to usurp power. In his view, this new constitutional philosophy
threatens the fundamental understanding of the American constitutional democracy created by
the Framers. Boudin accuses Peckham of tossing aside a century worth of judicial history and
precedent in order to promote his own opinion concerning current economic policies. “But when
constitutionality ceased to be the question of power which it was under Marshall and his
immediate successors, and became a question of reasonableness of the use of an admitted power,
the written constitution which was the source as well as the measure of the Judicial Power under
the Marshall theory of constitutional government was thrown overboard.”84
Boudin points to Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1896) as the case that facilitated the Court’s
decision in Lochner. The constitutional theory developed in that decision enables the
conservative justices to evaluate economic policy based on its reasonableness with precedent to
support that decision:
The sad truth is, that out constitutional theory ever since the Allgeyer Case has
been the same in substance, and that that substance included the possibility of
83

Ibid, 441.
Ibid, 441.

84

49

such decisions as the Lochner, the Ives, the Child Labor, and the Adkins cases.
That theory did not of course require these decisions, but it made them possible.
For that theory was, in effect, nothing more nor less than that the United States
Supreme Court, and every other court in its own sphere or domain, was a superlegislature passing upon the acts of the ordinary legislature practically at will—
killing some, maiming or deforming others, and permitting only those to survive
which the judges, or the majority of them, approve of, or at least do not
emphatically disapprove of.”85
Boudin’s outrage with Justice Peckham opinion leads him to also express frustration with
the dissenting opinions, as well, because he does not believe either Justice Harlan or Holmes
goes far enough. He criticizes both Holmes and Harlan for failing to acknowledge the absolute
newness of judicial evaluation of statutes based on their reasonableness. Boudin feels that they
both needed to explicitly address Justice Peckham’s complete disregard for the constitutional
philosophy developed by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison (1803),
substituting his own instead:
But the most interesting thing about these dissenting opinions, from our point of
view, is a certain deficiency, which, we regret to say, occurs in Justice Holmes’
opinion as well as in Mr. Justice Harlan’s, and which to us, seriously mars Mr.
Justice Holmes’ otherwise truly great masterpiece. This deficiency, to our mind,
consists in the utter absence of any criticism of the basic position of Mr. Justice
Peckham’s constitutional doctrine. Neither of these opinions calls to attention the
newness of Mr. Justice Peckham’s constitutional doctrine. Nor exposes the
radical departure from our constitutional theory as definitely settled and
universally understood before the advent of Field, Peckham & Co. or its
revolutionary character as far as the framework of our constitutional government
is concerned, in that it raises the courts to the position of super-legislature.86
Boudin complements Justice Harlan for adequately responding to, and criticizing the
assertions made by, Justice Peckham concerning the reasonableness of the New York Statute.
“Mr. Justice Harlan’s less famous dissenting opinion, in which Justices White and Day
concurred, is a very able criticism of Justice Peckham’s assertion of the unreasonableness of an
eight hour law for bakers, and of the rather puerile arguments advanced by Mr. Justice Peckham
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as to the ‘arbitrariness’ of the ten hour limit set by the law.” 87 But Boudin does not find any
hints that Justice Harlan understands the implications of the sudden shift in constitutional theory
for the future of the Court. For Boudin, Harlan is reactionary in the composition of his dissent
and addresses the details of Justice Peckham’s argument, but never entirely disputes his
approach.
Boudin outwardly praises the Holmes’ decision as brief but one that will “probably rank
in the annals of our jurisprudence with Justice Curtis’ dissent in the Dred Scott Case.”88 Boudin
points out, though, that Justice Holmes, too, does not take his argument far enough. “That Mr.
Justice Holmes disagrees with the rule formulated by Mr. Justice Peckham and adopted by the
majority of the Court is quite evident…But we doubt very much whether his dissent was meant
to go as far as the basic position of the new constitutional theory, namely, that questions of
constitutionality are not questions of power to legislate, but of the reasonableness of legislation”
(Emphasis in original).89 Boudin argues that Holmes danced around the fundamental issue:
Peckham fundamentally changes the role of the Court and its function in American society.
Boudin argues that Lochner v. New York (1905) best exemplifies the sort of legislating
from the bench that he most abhors. The case, to him, is an obvious example of how the
Supreme Court has slowly become a super-legislature, radically departing from it true mission
for Boudin. He argues that Chief Justice John Marshall intended for the Court to act as an
evaluator of the power to legislate when he described judicial review for the first time in
Marbury v. Madison (1803). Boudin writes, “And so they decided that there was no escape
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except in the rule set up by John Marshall, and followed by his successors before the advent of
the ‘modern’ constitutional doctrine—namely, that constitutionality is a question of the power to
legislate and not of the use made of that power” (Emphasis in original). 90
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CHAPTER 5:
The Post-Lochner and Pre-New Deal Court
A Movement Away from Lochner v. New York (1905)
After the Court decided Lochner v. New York (1905), there was immediate criticism of its
incursion into the policy-making realm reserved for the Legislative branch. In response to
criticism from liberals and conservatives alike for over-extending its power, the Supreme Court
began to shift away from this unpopular position. Boudin remarks that the justices began to try
to distance themselves from the decision in the Lochner Case and writes,
But if “enlightened public opinion” expressing itself in criticism of a particular
decision of the United States Supreme Court, may not be able to make that Court
turn around and overrule the decision criticized in order to get itself au courant of
that opinion, it may cause it to pause or just swerve a bit from the direction
marked by the criticized decision, so as to be able in time to get around it. That is
exactly what happened to the Lochner Case.91
Boudin finds that the backlash from Lochner v. New York steered the Court into a whole
new era—the Progressive Era—complimented by Theodore Roosevelt’s accession to the
presidency in 1901 following assassination of William McKinley. The justices realized that
consequences from public opinion would damage the relationship between the Judiciary and the
other branches and undermine the authority of its decisions if nothing changed. For many, the
Court had gone a step too far and the backlash forced the justices to address the controversy.
Boudin writes,
Whatever the psychological reasons for the Lochner decision, in so far as they had
their source in contemporary history, may have been, it is clear that after the
storm of adverse criticism of that case actually broke, the Court found that it had
made a grave error, and was at least ready to compromise with current public
opinion. As a result, the Progressive Era ushered in by Mr. Roosevelt’s election
to the presidency found its reflection in what might be called the Progressive
Phase in history of our Government by Judiciary.92
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After Lochner, Boudin identifies a transition period in which the Court slowly overturns
Lochner v. New York. Boudin asserts that this period began with the Court’s decision in Muller
v. Oregon (1908) and was complete in 1915 with Bunting v. Oregon. During this time, the Court
was forced to deal with its tarnished reputation and the public’s growing distrust of the justices
as a result of their abuse of judicial power. Boudin analyzes the effect that public opinion has on
the Court and concludes that the structure of the Court prevents it from ever being either
reactionary or progressive in comparison to the public:
That the Supreme Court is not the most reactionary tribunal in the United States
may be freely granted. In fact, its composition and manner of its appointment
prevent it from being such. And the same causes prevent it from being the most
progressive tribunal in the United States. The truth is that the United States
Supreme Court is peculiarly the child of chance; and chance plays a more
important in its decisions than in the decisions of any other court in the land.93
Boudin’s assertion that chance serves as a major factor for the Court falls in line with his
understanding that the judicial power is dangerous and has the potential to be abused. This is
partly the result of the role that chance plays in their decisions—for instance, who is serving on
the Court at a given time, the specific facts of the case, etc. In Muller v. Oregon (1908), Boudin
is concerned that the Supreme Court again decided a case using the same activist philosophy as it
was in Lochner v. New York (1905).
Muller v. Oregon (1908) involved the constitutionality of an Oregon state statute that
limited the working hours of women. The Court upheld the constitutionality of this statute and
reasoned that a distinction should be drawn between men and women concerning specific kinds
of labor. The majority cited both the impact they believed heavy labor could have on a woman’s
body and the effect it could have on her maternal instincts. As a result, the state of Oregon, the
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Court asserted, had the authority to enact this statute. The Court’s decision creates the false
sense for many that it was transitioning away from the decision in Lochner to being increasingly
progressive concerning the powers of the states. Boudin strongly disagrees with these assertions
about Muller v. Oregon (1908) and believes the opinion of the Court reinforced the constitutional
theory put forward in Lochner. He writes,
That the decision was a victory for liberal ideas of government, and indicated a
progressive attitude on the part of the Supreme Court towards labor legislation, is
beyond question. But that it had a deep significance as regards that constitutional
problem, which is the basis for our entire problem of social legislation in general
and labor legislation in particular, is quite untrue, and its reputation in that respect
is entirely undeserved. This decision, contrary to general belief, did not announce
any better or different constitutional principle than that formulated in Lochner v.
New York. If anything, it was worse than the Lochner Case from the point of view
of constitutional principle, because it accentuated the worst features of that
decision.94 (Emphasis in original)
Boudin argues that, despite the Court’s striking down a law as unconstitutional in
Lochner and upholding the law in question in Muller, both opinions rely upon the same
constitutional theory. This theory emphasizes that legislative interference with the citizen’s
liberty to contract should take place very limitedly. In the Lochner case, the Court decided that
the New York State legislature did not have a strong enough reason to interfere with the liberty
of contracts of bakers. In the Muller case, the Court simply applied the same rule and found that
Oregon’s law demonstrated that it was necessary for the state to limit the liberty of contract due
to the physiological differences between men and women. Boudin argues,
For upon careful examination it will be found that the Court not only reaffirmed
the principle laid down in Lochner v. New York that there must be special reasons
for legislative interference with liberty of contract by way of limiting the number
of hours of labor, but it actually went a step further and announced, in its
reservation, that even where special circumstances give the Legislature a right to
legislate, the Court still reserve to itself the right of inspecting each part of the
legislation separately, in order to make sure that the legislative notion of the
protection needed does not go beyond that of the Court in each separate
94
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instance.95
After identifying the same constitutional theory in both cases, Boudin focuses on the fact
that the justices reinforce in both decisions that it is the role of the Court to determine the
circumstances when the state is justified in limiting the liberty to contract. For Boudin, the
Court’s actions solidify the expansion of the judicial power through the affirmation of the
positive relationship between the Court’s economic theory and the Constitution. This decision
ensures that the Court can be the only government institution to evaluate the constitutionality of
legislation. Boudin argues that despite the Court’s recognition of its own error in Lochner, it did
not fully understand the nature of that error and how to correct it. Boudin quotes part of Justice
Brewer’s majority opinion to further prove his point that Muller v. Oregon (1908) was not a
progressive decision.
“Constitutional questions, it is true, are not settled by even a consensus of present
public opinion, for it is the peculiar value of a written constitution that it places in
unchanging form limitations upon legislative action, and thus gives a permanence
and stability to popular government which otherwise would be lacking. At the
same time, when a question of fact is debated and debatable, and the extent to
which a special constitutional limitation goes is affected by the truth in respect to
that fact, a wide-spread and long continued belief concerning it is of
consideration.” The Court was clearly taking care that the trees should not grow
too tall. It was making sure that the situation should not slip out of its own
hands…Clearly, it was not only maintaining the principle of Lochner v. New
York. It was improving upon it quite a bit.96
In the decade following the Lochner case, the Court moved away from its decision and
officially overturned it in 1917 in Bunting v. Oregon (described on the following page). Boudin
argues the Court took a decade to reverse the decision for three reasons. First, as is discussed
briefly above, the Court is not, and will never be, the most progressive branch of government.
Its design and structure prevent if from being so and it took time for the Court to shift away from
its intense focus on protecting the liberty of contract and to respond to the strong public reaction
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to the opinion. Second, many were satisfied with the steps the Court took in Muller v. Oregon
(1908) and did not recognize the identical constitutional theory that was applied in Lochner,
applied in this case as well. Lastly and most significantly, when deciding Bunting v. Oregon
(1917), every justice—save Justice McKenna—that composed the majority of the Court in
Lochner v. New York (1905) had retired and been replaced, changing the position of the Court
regarding economic policy cases.97
Bunting v. Oregon (1917) is a case involving the constitutionality of a Oregon state
statute limiting the working hours of mill, factory, or manufacturing workers in addition to their
overtime hours. 98 Writing for the majority, Justice McKenna announces the Court’s decision to
uphold the constitutionality of the Oregon statute and support the claim that the purpose of the
law was to protect the health of employees. He contends that this law is fair and does not
provide any kind of advantage to certain workers. It is interesting to note that Justice McKenna
was selected to write this opinion because he is the lone holdover from the Court that decided
Lochner and was in the majority.
From the Court’s announcement in Bunting v. Oregon (1917), Boudin understands the
opinion of the Court to be another major landmark for the constitutional history of the nation.
Boudin identifies it as the opinion that invalidates Lochner v. New York (1905) and recognizes
the state’s legitimate interest in protecting public health through the police power of the state.
With this decision, the Court finished divorcing itself from valuing the liberty of contract above
all and applying its own economic theory to the Constitution. Unlike other landmark decisions,
Bunting v. Oregon (1917) is not often recognized because of the manner in which Justice
McKenna wrote the opinion, specifically failing to mention by name Lochner v. New York
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(1905).99 Boudin quotes the passage from Justice McKenna’s opinion where he struck down
Lochner v. New York (1905) to demonstrate its lack of force and clarity:
“This case is submitted by plaintiff in error upon the contention that the law is a
wage law, not an hours of service law, and he rests his case on that contention. To
that contention we address our decision, and do not discuss or consider the
broader contentions of counsel for the state that would justify the law even as a
regulation of wages. There is a contention made that the law, even regarded as
regulating hours of service, is not either necessary or useful “for preservation of
the health of employees in mills, factories, and manufacturing establishments.”
The record contains no facts to support the contention, and against it is the
judgment of the legislature and the supreme court, which said: “In view of the
well known fact that the custom in our industries does not sanction a longer
service than ten hours per day, it cannot be held as a matter of law that the
legislative requirement is unreasonable or arbitrary as to hours of labor. Statistics
show that the average daily working time among workingmen in different
countries is, in Australia, 8 hours; in Britain, 9; in the United States, 9 3/4; in
Denmark, 9 3/4; in Norway, 10; Sweden, France, and Switzerland, 10 1/2;
Germany, 10 1/4; Belgium, Italy, and Austria, 11, and in Russia, 12 hours.’”100
By neglecting to mention the Lochner case, the Court limits the scope of this decision.
Boudin reprimands the Court for choosing not to put its full weight behind its decision and
weakening its own argument. He remarks, “The greatest merit of the Bunting Case consisted in
the overruling of the Lochner Case, even though that case is not referred to in the opinion. It also
did away with the reservations contained in Muller v. Oregon.”101 Boudin continues, “If the
Court had actually intended to lay down another rule, as was afterwards claimed by some of its
members, the Court had only itself to blame if its work fell short of its purpose—for this was the
direct result of its not having the courage to say so in unmistakable term.”102
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A Return to Lochner v. New York (1905)
Despite the seeming strides made by the Court in the decade post-Lochner v. New York
(1905), in the early 1920’s, the Court handed down a series of decisions that represented a return
to Lochner and the expansion of the judicial power. This culminated with Adkins v. Children’s
Hospital (1923), which involved a District of Columbia statute guaranteeing a minimum wage to
women and children. In this opinion, Justice Sutherland decides that the minimum wage law
was unconstitutional because it exceeds the limits of the police power of the state. Instead, he
chooses to uphold the liberty of contracts and the ability of citizens to function within the
marketplace free from government intrusion and regulation.
Justice Sutherland examines the judicial power of review and the duty of the Judiciary to
strike down laws if they are inconsistent with provisions of the Constitution, referencing Chief
Justice Marshall’s articulation of that power. He writes,
The judicial duty of passing upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress is one
of great gravity and delicacy. The statute here in question has successfully borne
the scrutiny of the legislative branch of the government, which, by enacting it, has
affirmed its validity, and that determination must be given great weight. This
Court, by an unbroken line of decisions from Chief Justice Marshall to the present
day, has steadily adhered to the rule that every possible presumption is in favor of
the validity of an act of Congress until overcome beyond rational doubt. But if, by
clear and indubitable demonstration, a statute be opposed to the Constitution, we
have no choice but to say so. The Constitution, by its own terms, is the supreme
law of the land, emanating from the people, the repository of ultimate sovereignty
under our form of government. A congressional statute, on the other hand, is the
act of an agency of this sovereign authority, and, if it conflict with the
Constitution, must fall; for that which is not supreme must yield to that which is.
To hold it invalid (if it be invalid) is a plain exercise of the judicial power—that
power vested in courts to enable them to administer justice according to law.
From the authority to ascertain and determine the law in a given case, there
necessarily results, in case of conflict, the duty to declare and enforce the rule of
the supreme law and reject that of an inferior act of legislation which,
transcending the Constitution, is of no effect and binding on no one. This is not
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the exercise of a substantive power to review and nullify acts of Congress, for no
such substantive power exists. It is simply a necessary concomitant of the power
to hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly before the court, to the
determination of which must be brought the test and measure of the law.103
Justice Sutherland includes this explanation of the power of judicial review immediately
preceding his striking down the D.C. minimum wage statute as unconstitutional. He references a
number of cases as precedents, including Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897), Lochner v. New York
(1905), Muller v. Oregon (1908) among many others. Looking at these three particular cases
that inform his opinion, they have an interesting factor in common: each expands judicial power
while simultaneously reinforcing the liberty to contract and asserting the conservative economic
preferences of the Supreme Court at the time. Concerning the Washington, D.C. minimum wage
law, Justice Sutherland writes,
The statute now under consideration is attacked upon the ground that it authorizes
an unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract included within the
guarantees of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. That the right to
contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual protected by
this clause, is settled by the decisions of this Court and is no longer open to
question.104
To support this claim he quotes extensively from Justice Peckham’s opinion in Lochner
v. New York (1905). This includes both Justice Peckham’s evaluation of the tension between two
powers—the state’s police power and the individual’s liberty of contract—and his determination
that the liberty of contract must prevail. The only way in which Justice Sutherland admits that
the liberty of contract is not an absolute right that could never be limited is by assigning the right
to evaluate and validate any legislation to the Courts.
There is, of course, no such thing as absolute freedom of contract. It is subject to a
great variety of restraints. But freedom of contract is, nevertheless, the general
rule, and restraint the exception, and the exercise of legislative authority to
abridge it can be justified only by the existence of exceptional circumstances.
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Whether these circumstances exist in the present case constitutes the question to
be answered.105
Justice Holmes authors a dissenting opinion that questions the motives of the justices in
the majority and criticizes the reasons they cite to strike down the statute. The foundation of
Justice Holmes’s argument is the idea that the Legislature is comprised of reasonable men whose
responsibility it is to make policy decisions and enact pieces of legislation in the best interest of
their constituents. This argument aligns with Boudin’s views concerning how the Supreme
Court should decide cases, only striking down laws when absolutely necessary and granting
deference to the expertise of the Legislature. Justice Holmes writes,
To me, notwithstanding the deference due to the prevailing judgment of the Court,
the power of Congress seems absolutely free from doubt. The end, to remove
conditions leading to ill health, immorality and the deterioration of the race, no
one would deny to be within the scope of constitutional legislation. The means are
means that have the approval of Congress, of many States, and of those
governments from which we have learned our greatest lessons. When so many
intelligent persons, who have studied the matter more than any of us can, have
thought that the means are effective and are worth the price, it seems to me
impossible to deny that the belief reasonably may be held by reasonable men.106
In his brief dissenting opinion, Justice Holmes is concerned with the Court’s return to
valuing the liberty of contract at the cost of balance of powers and states’ rights. Justice Holmes
does appreciate the sanctity of contracts, but thinks that the Court is mistaken to interpret the
phrase “liberty of contract” to mean the right of the people to do whatever they please in the
realm of business and employment. No right is absolute, Holmes argues, and it is appropriate
that, when a right is limited, the state legislature would be the political body to impose these
limitations because of its responsiveness the people. Holmes writes,
The earlier decisions upon the same words in the Fourteenth Amendment began
within our memory and went no farther than an unpretentious assertion of the
liberty to follow the ordinary callings. Later, that innocuous generality was
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expanded into the dogma, Liberty of Contract. Contract is not specially mentioned
in the text that we have to construe. It is merely an example of doing what you
want to do, embodied in the word liberty. But pretty much all law consists in
forbidding men to do some things that they want to do, and contract is no more
exempt from law than other acts.107
Holmes believes the majority of the justices are reverting back to evaluating legislation
based upon substance, rather than judging whether it is within the power of the Legislature to
create such statutes. Holmes writes in response, “The criterion of constitutionality is not whether
we believe the law to be for the public good.”108 Justice Holmes wants to consider the question
of the power that is at stake in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923). Based on his examination
of the case, he affirms that the state does have a vested interest in public health that could be
manifested through the enactment of a minimum wage law. Justice Holmes’s dissent is
reminiscent of Justice Harlan’s in Lochner v. New York (1905) based on his denial of the
constitutional theory employed by the majority to decide the case.
Boudin is greatly dismayed by this decision and the backwards trend adopted by the
Court, but Justice Holmes’ dissent serves as a small beacon of hope for Boudin. He praises
Holmes for his articulation of a different constitutional principle that relies heavily on restraint
and deference to the Legislature. Boudin explains, “And in so doing, he [Holmes] practically
gives his own constitutional rule without attempting to formulate one…It is the familiar rule—
long fought for by Mr. Justice Holmes, often stated in the name of the Supreme Court, but
unfortunately never adhered to—that a law must be utterly unreasonable in order to give a court
the right to declare it unconstitutional” (Emphasis in original).109 Boudin appreciates the way
that Holmes employs a Thayerian concept of judicial restraint in this decision. He identifies
Justice Holmes as a dedicated progressive, on a Supreme Court filled with justices who operate
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in overly activist and reactionary ways.
For Boudin, Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923) also highlights another power that the
Court has granted itself: the power to reverse course regardless of its own precedents. He argues
this decision gave the Court full authority to make governing decisions for the nation with regard
to its own previous decisions. Boudin identifies this as the culmination of the expansion of
power by the Supreme Court that began with Marbury v. Madison (1803) and the development
of the power of judicial review, and continued with the drastic limitation of legislative power by
the Court in Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897). The Judiciary is now so powerful and dangerous, in
Boudin’s thinking, and has changed so drastically from its original construction by the Framers
of the Constitution that it is barely recognizable.
It proves that the Judicial Power is not only strong enough to erect barriers against
progress but strong enough to force the country backwards. These are all
practical matters of the first importance to all those who are interested in the
welfare of the country. Not to ‘radicals’ only, or ‘liberals’ or ‘progressives,’ but
to all ordinary, sensible persons, who believe that small concessions to public
sentiment are in the end much cheaper for the propertied classes that the
uncompromising attitude which will give up nothing that is not taken away
forcibly.110
Boudin also points out that Adkins did not have to be decided in the manner that Justice
Sutherland chose. He elaborates that the precedents Sutherland cites are chosen expressly to
enable him to move the Court backwards. There were other cases that could have guided his
opinion in a different direction altogether. For Boudin, the Court’s changes in position on
economic policy after Lochner v. New York (1905) through Bunting v. Oregon (1917), while
moving closer to prevailing public opinion also moved them away from being bound by existing
precedent. The justices in the majority chose to only cite the precedents that suited their own
economic policy preferences and applied them to the facts of the Adkins v. Children’s Hospital
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(1923). Boudin suggests that the prevailing constitutional theory applied to economic cases had
not truly changed since Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897) when the Court prevented the state from
limiting insurance companies conducting business in Louisiana. Boudin writes,
The sad truth is, that out constitutional theory ever since the Allgeyer Case has
been the same in substance, and that that substance included the possibility of
such decisions as the Lochner, the Ives, the Child Labor, and the Adkins cases.
That theory did not of course require these decisions, but it made them possible.
For that theory was, in effect, nothing more nor less than that the United States
Supreme Court, and every other court in its own sphere or domain, was a superlegislature passing upon the acts of the ordinary legislature practically at will—
killing some, maiming or deforming others, and permitting only those to survive
which the judges, or the majority of them, approve of, or at least do not
emphatically disapprove of.111
Boudin uses this progression of the Court’s stance on economic policy to examine the
greater shift of judicial power over time and to understand the modern role of the Court
compared to its construction in the Constitution. By the early 1920’s, Boudin believes that the
Court has become the worst possible version of itself. He feels that the Judiciary has abandoned
all of the guiding principles that both impose limits on its power and provide an accountability
structure. The Judiciary no longer consists of justices functioning within a branch of government
whose role was limited and defined. The Court, through its activist decisions, has greatly
expanded its own power and is no longer the institution it was envisioned to be by the Framers.
Boudin argues,
On principle there should be no such thing as Judicial Power. But even with the
Judicial Power principles are not useless. In fact, they are absolutely necessary, if
the courts are to remain courts instead of becoming super-legislatures. And
principles require the formation of hard and fast rules. At least, hard and fast for
all practical purposes. Even hard and fast rules will be deviated from at times.
But with such rules the Constitution, and the right of the people to selfgovernment, would be at least reasonably safe from judicial interference. 112
(Emphasis in original)
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This is not an isolated anomaly. It is a continuing and worrisome trend that began in the
Lochner case and continues to be seen in Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan (1924). This case involves
the constitutionality of a statute regulating the weight of loaves of bread to prevent fraud by
merchants and cheating of customers. Boudin points out that this law also ensured fair
competition between bakers. Justice Butler writing the opinion of the Court asserts that,
Undoubtedly, the police power of the state may be exerted to protect purchasers
from imposition by sale of short weight loaves. Schmidinger v. Chicago. Many
laws have been passed for that purpose. But a state may not, under the guise of
protecting the public, arbitrarily interfere with private business or prohibit lawful
occupations or impose unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions upon them.
Lawton v. Steele. Constitutional protection having been invoked, it is the duty of
the court to determine whether the challenged provision has reasonable relation to
the protection of purchasers of bread against fraud by short weights and really
tends to accomplish the purpose for which it was enacted. Meyer v. Nebraska,
supra; Welch v. Swasey; Dobbins v. Los Angeles; Connolly v Union Sewer Pipe
Co.; Lawton v. Steele.113
Justice Butler’s opinion is reminiscent of Justice Peckham’s in Lochner v. New York
(1905) both in the language used and the themes are present. Justice Butler explores in great
depth the details of the bread-making process and describes them in his opinion.114 He does so
to try to prove that this law is an abuse of the police power of the state and that the state interest
is not strong enough to override the individual’s liberty of contract. He suggests the law includes
arbitrary regulations and unnecessary restrictions in the manner that the state chose to enact
them.
Justice Butler concedes that the state does—in some cases—have the power to regulate
the loaf-size and weight of bread, but the state must do so in different way that does not violate
the liberty of contracts. Butler openly evaluates the statute based on the reasonableness of its
substance instead of on the Nebraska legislature’s right to pass such a statute. Justice Butler
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concludes that the statute is not reasonable and is therefore unconstitutional. For Boudin, Butler
is attempting to shape policy, which is not the duty of an appointed justice.
Justice Brandeis writes a dissenting opinion (which Justice Holmes also signed) that
proves the Court was wrong in its interpretation of the facts of the case, and asserts a different
constitutional theory. Boudin praises Brandeis for his ability to write such an opinion. Brandeis
introduces Congressional testimony that notes the positive effect of the law on the workers’
rights and its support from industry. Boudin explains,
In fact, he managed to do what a dissenting judge is very rarely able to do in such
cases, and that is, prove that at least a large section of industrialists whose rights
are supposed to be protected by declaring the law unconstitutional considered the
legislation necessary…We are not, however, concerned here with Justice
Brandeis’ demonstration of the fact that the Supreme Court was wrong in its
judgment, but with his opinion as to the function that the Supreme Court was
exercising in rendering it.115
Boudin is interested in Justice Brandeis’ assertion the Court had erred in both the method
it employed to decide Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan (1924) and in the selection of the constitutional
theory to support its decision. Justice Brandeis clearly distinguishes between his concept of
judicial review and the definition asserted by the majority in the opinion of the Court. Brandeis
identifies the use of reasonableness as the major distinction between these two definitions. He
claims that judicial review is a tool that allows the Court to strike down legislation when it is
unreasonable only when the Congress did not have the power or the right to enact such
legislation. According to Brandeis, the majority evaluates the substance of the legislation itself
and concludes that Congress possesses the power to impose regulations on the bread baking
industry but they disagree with the legislation that was enacted. Justice Brandeis writes,
It is not our providence to weigh evidence. Put at its highest, our function is to
determine, in the light of all other facts which may enrich our knowledge and
enlarge our understanding, whether the measure, enacted in the exercise of an
115
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unquestioned police power, and of a character inherently unobjectionable,
transcends the bounds of reason. That is, whether the provision, as applied, is so
clearly arbitrary or capricious that legislators, acting reasonably, could not have
believed it to be necessary or appropriate for the public welfare. To decide, as a
fact, that the prohibition of excess weights ‘is not necessary for the protection of
the purchasers against imposition and fraud by short weights’; that it ‘is not
calculated to effectuate that purpose’; and that it ‘subjects bakers and sellers of
bread’ to heavy burdens,—is, in my opinion, an exercise of the powers of a superlegislature,—not the performance of the constitutional function of judicial
review.116 (Emphasis in original)
During the early 1920’s, the Court continued to exert power over the legislative process
and Justices Brandeis and Holmes continued to assert their own new constitutional principle
similar to the dissent in Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan (1924). Boudin commends the two justices
for taking “a long step forward”117 on a Court that was otherwise moving the country
increasingly backwards. This constitutional principle identified by Boudin is characterized by a
remembrance of the ideals and values that Chief Justice John Marshall distilled in his opinion in
Marbury v. Madison (1803). Boudin remarks,
It seems that the use which the United States Supreme Court in its newest phase
was making the rule of “reasonableness,” to which the entire Court had settled
down during its Progressive Phase, made Justice Holmes and Brandeis realize the
utter untenability of that rule, as well as its dangerous character. And so they
decided that there was no escape except in the rule set up by John Marshall, and
followed by his successors before the advent of the ‘modern’ constitutional
doctrine—namely, that constitutionality is a question of the power to legislate and
not of the use made of that power.118 (Emphasis in original)
Looking Forward
By the early 1920’s, Louis Boudin is completely dismayed with the Supreme Court’s
trajectory concerning social and economic legislation. The more he analyzes cases during this
time period, the more he is convinced that there is little hope for a return to a restrained
Judiciary. In the first fifty years of the modern judicial branch up through Dred only two
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legislative acts had been struck down as unconstitutional. In the twentieth century, though, it
was a much more common practice, evidence of the activism on the Court that Boudin despises:
The conscience of the present judges of the United States Supreme Court
demands of them an increasing degree of supervision of social legislation,
resulting in a marked increase in the number of legislative acts declared
unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court. One cannot help being
impressed by the number of decisions in which social legislation has been
declared unconstitutional by a divided court and over vigorous dissent since the
Adkins Case.119
Boudin published Government by Judiciary in 1932 and it included cases through the
early 1920’s. He published as the Great Depression gripped the nation, resulting in a virtual war
between the branches of government. The regressive Supreme Court continued to support the
liberty of contracts above all, and battled with the new Executive, President Franklin Roosevelt,
who sent an ambitious agenda of social legislation to Congress in an attempt to pull the nation
out of the Depression. Then the Court included the ultra-conservative “four horsemen”—
Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter—who exercised a stranglehold over
the Court and maintained its post-Lochner constitutional philosophy.
In response to the Court’s repeated striking down of his social and economic legislation,
President Roosevelt’s put forward a “court-packing plan.” In the plan, Roosevelt threatened to
add a new justice to the Supreme Court for every justice over the age of seventy. This direct
threat to the make-up of the Court caused Justice Owen Roberts, who had consistently voted with
the conservatives, to change his position out fear that the Court would be expanded and President
Roosevelt would be able to appoint multiple new justices. This last minute switch by Justice
Roberts—known as “the switch in time that saved nine”—preserved the institution of the
Supreme Court in its form, but brought major changes in the constitutional theories under which
it operated.
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CHAPTER 6:
Looking Forward After Boudin
The term “judicial activism” is commonly used to refer to justices who frequently vote to
strike down laws enacted by democratically elected legislatures. In the twenty-first century,
these activists are typically those identified as “conservatives,” like Justices Roberts, Scalia and
Thomas. More than a century ago, the “judicial activists” on the Court were also
“conservatives.” Like liberals today, the liberals of that earlier era complained loudly and
bitterly about judicial activism.
During the early twentieth century and the Lochner era, the courts focused heavily on
cases addressing business and economic issues. When the Court decided a case, politically
conservative justices tended to be the ones advocating for activism by striking down
Congressional or state legislation. This activism aligned with the conservative values of the
functioning of the uninhibited free market and limited government interference with business.
Conversely, those justices who identified as liberal advocated for a more restrained judiciary,
which deferred to the decisions of the popularly elected branches of government. During the era
of Chief Justice Earl Warren (1953 through 1969), however, the Court shifted its focus away
from questions of economic policy and towards questions of individual and minority rights. As
the cases coming before the Supreme Court changed, there was a marked shift in the tendency
towards activism on the part of the justices. The liberal justices began to advocate for a more
activist role for the Court when answering questions concerning individual rights and civil
liberties. Conservative justices, on the other hand, began to argue for increased restraint in these
cases, a reversal of their historical positions.
Judge Richard Posner of the 7th Circuit Court identifies this period of time as the “death
of judicial restraint” as it was conceived by Thayer and described in his 1893 Harvard Law
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Review article, “The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law.” At
New York University’s Brennan Center for Justice’s Jorde Symposium in 2011, Posner outlined
his understanding of the underlying causes for the death of judicial restraint at this time. Posner
is known for his conservative stances and his frequent publications in conjunction with the
Federalist Society—a conservative legal society founded by Antonin Scalia and several of his
then-law school colleagues. Judge Posner defined Thayerian restraint as the view that to strike
down a law as unconstitutional, it is not enough for the justice to believe it to be unconstitutional.
The justice must conclude that no rational person would be able to support the constitutionality
of the law in question.120 To display Thayerian restraint, justices must limit their own
interference with the decisions of the popularly elected branches.
Judge Posner points to multiple factors causing this “death” and he examines the
Supreme Court during the Civil Rights Movement to understand the activism of the time.121 As
a conservative it is perhaps not surprising that Posner sees the primary catalyst for the death of
Thayerian restraint was the appointment of the Earl Warren as Chief Justice. Warren and his
fellow justices changed the face of America in terms of civil rights and civil liberties in the
1950’s and 1960’s with decisions that continue to affect the nation today.122 The Warren Court
is often characterized as valuing and protecting the rights of minority groups. The Civil Rights
Movement was a time of intense racial discord in America. It was directly due to the Warren
Court’s striking down of prejudicial laws enacted by state legislatures that integration of public
institutions began across the nation.
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Many of the Court’s decisions regarding civil rights and civil liberties were unpopular
because the justices’ views on the rights of minority citizens did not reflect prevailing public
opinion at the time, especially in southern states. This made them difficult to enforce. The
Congress and Executive branch also did not agree about the status of minority groups, which
exacerbated the issue. This political and geographic divide provided the opening for the Warren
Court to take on questions of race and minority rights. Congress’s impasse on the issue of civil
rights put the Court in the position to take a lead role in making policy.
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954), the Warren Court’s most famous
decision, demonstrates the difficulty that the Court faced when it handing down unpopular
decisions. Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren rejected the “separate but
equal” standard adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). Warren concludes that “separate but
equal” accommodations were inherently unequal. Topeka’s segregated schools must be
integrated. This decision was exceedingly unpopular in the South and it required the National
Guard to enforce the decision in some districts (Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957). Integration was
a contentious issue throughout the nation, despite race relations being far better in northern
states. This was evidenced by the riots over court-ordered integration by bussing in Boston,
Massachusetts in the 1970’s. Brown demonstrates the tension that liberals had felt between their
historic advocacy of a restrained judiciary in the area of economic policy (restraint supported by
Thayer and Boudin) and their dedication to protecting civil rights and civil liberties for
individuals and minority groups, which resulted in judicial activism in these arenas.
Posner also identifies a sharp rise in the expression of specific, defined constitutional
philosophies by the justices, as a cause of the death of Thayerian judicial restraint. 123 Posner
postulates that earlier generations of justices benefitted from an increased tolerance for pragmatic
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decision-making and decreased scrutiny of changes of opinion from case to case. Consistency
in decision-making has become a highly valued trait in modern day judges, largely as the result
of the increased politicization of judicial appointments. During the appointment process, the
President and the Congress now question and expect to understand a clearly expressed
constitutional philosophy of a nominee. This level of detail and specificity of opinion was not
expected in earlier decades. With the Executive and Legislative branches wanting to be able to
predict the decision making of justices in advance, this has required most nominees to have a
long history of articles and opinions. This in turn has led to candidates for judicial appointments
lacking the diversity in background and previous experience that had been present in previous
generations of justices.124 These justices focused less on “theorizing about how to decide
constitutional issues”125 and more on how precedents would apply to the specific facts of the
case to form the decision. The shift towards the professionalization of justices began, Posner
believes, in response to the activism of the Warren Court. Conservatives felt that through each
successive appointment, the Court needed to be rebalanced which could only occur if the views
of prospective justices were well understood before their confirmation.
The nature of judicial activism on the Supreme Court has clearly shifted since Louis
Boudin was writing in 1932. The Court today faces different challenges than it did during the
first hundred and thirty years of its existence. Boudin identifies that the Judiciary and the
justices’ use of the power of judicial review exponentially expanded up to the late 1920’s in
ways that he saw as antithetical to American constitutional democracy. Boudin writes that
through their abuse of power, justices created a government of men—namely the unelected
Supreme Court justices—who usurped the government of laws described in the Constitution.
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Judge Posner recognized that Thayerian judicial restraint had become increasingly difficult for
justices to apply because of the activism of the Warren Court and the resulting politicization of
judicial appointments.126
The Response Post-Warren Court and the Impact Chief Justice William Rehnquist
Chief Justice Earl Warren retired from the Court in 1969 and was succeeded by Warren
Burger, the first appointment to the Supreme Court by President Richard Nixon. As Chief
Justice Warren stepped down, President Johnson had attempted to elevate the liberal Associate
Justice Abe Fortas as his replacement as Chief Justice. The conservatives in the Senate, though,
tired of what they saw as liberal activism and filibustered Johnson’s nomination of Fortas.
Instead, Nixon selected Warren’s replacement and chose Burger, who was known as a
conservative and a strict constructionist in his understanding of the Constitution. Nixon hoped
Burger would play an integral role in reforming the liberal activism of the Court..127
Unexpectedly, Burger demonstrated that his conservative background did not define
him.128 Nixon’s attempt to fundamentally change the political direction of the Court created
instead the beginning of the extreme politicization of the Supreme Court nomination process.
Presidents strove to appoint justices who would align with their political views. Chief Justice,
though, tended to make decisions that were to some degree pragmatic and varied from case to
case. Burger’s voting patterns proved to be more difficult to predict than President Nixon
expected. On multiple occasions he wrote opinions that were seen to be in alignment with the
Court’s recent liberal history. For example, Chief Justice Burger voted in the majority in Roe v.
Wade (1972), one of the Court’s most famous cases. This landmark opinion written by Justice
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Blackmun upheld a woman’s right to an abortion as a privacy right afforded protection by the
Fourteenth Amendment.129
Decided during the same term, in Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), Chief Justice Burger once
again sided with many of his liberal colleagues in a decision protecting individual’s right to free
exercise of religion. In the case, members of the Mennonite Church claimed that it violated their
religion to send their children to school through the age of sixteen as was mandated by the state.
In an opinion authored by Burger, the Court determined that the right to religious freedom
trumped Wisconsin’s interests in promoting public education through mandatory school
attendance.130 Once again, as in Roe v. Wade (1972), Chief Justice Burger surprised
conservatives and voted to protect the rights of individuals and minority groups with many of his
liberal colleagues. President Nixon expected Chief Justice Burger to be a much more predictable
justice in his decisions. The transition by justices, identified by Posner, from pragmatic decision
making to the following pre-expressed constitutional philosophies was not completed until
Burger’s retirement in 1986.131
Two years after Chief Justice Burger’s appointment to the Court, President Nixon also
appointed William Rehnquist and they served together until Burger’s retirement.132 Rehnquist
was then elevated to Chief Justice and a central aspect of his expressed constitutional philosophy
relied on the Court acting in a restrained manner. Throughout his thirty-three year tenure on the
Court, Rehnquist demonstrated a deep appreciation for a restrained judiciary, advocating for very
limited judicial interference with legislative processes. Rehnquist’s constitutional theory is
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based on the premise that elected officials represent the views of the people and make decisions
on their behalf, the definition of self-government upon which the American constitutional
democracy is founded. Popularly elected officials must be trusted to understand the needs of the
people because they can be held directly accountable for their actions.133 This is not the case for
the Judiciary in which justices are generally appointed, rather than elected, and most serve life
terms. Rehnquist argues that members of the judiciary should be hesitant to reverse legislative
decisions unless absolutely necessary. These general views echo the writings of Louis Boudin
fifty years prior.
Chief Justice Rehnquist describes his constitutional philosophy and his interpretation of
the Constitution in his article “The Notion of a Living Constitution” (1976). Liberals justices
tend to describe the Constitution as a “living” document, understanding it as more flexible and
malleable than the modern day conservative conception of the Constitution as “fixed.”
Rehnquist uses his article to expand on this idea and explain in what specific and limited ways he
views the Constitution as a “living” document. He also defines the ways in which it should not
be considered “living” including arguing against the views that many of his liberal colleagues on
the Court support.
He points to the description of the “living” Constitution that the liberal Justice Holmes
provided in his Missouri v. Holland (1920) opinion. Rehnquist believes that this definition best
embodies the very limited way in which the Constitution could be construed as “living.”
Rehnquist quotes Holmes,
When we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the
Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a
being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the
most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they
133
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had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors must
sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation”.134
Holmes’ language best describes Rehnquist’s understanding that the Constitution will
have to be applied in situations never envisioned by the Framers. But Rehnquist warns that the
Judiciary must be careful not to expand the scope of its Constitutional powers beyond those that
were intended.135 He believes the Framers of the Constitution intentionally used general and
broad language so the Constitution could be applied to the future landscape of America.136 He
argues that this allows the Constitution to be a framework for society across generations.
Rehnquist reasons that this requires the Judiciary to be restrained in its decisions making and that
the Court must give deference to the policy-making of the Legislative branch.
Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that justices do not need to act as the “keepers of the
covenant,” referring to the Constitution.137 In Rehnquist’s view, the judicial branch should
simply serve to question certain popularly elected branches to ensure that they are using their
own powers as policy is created. Rehnquist argues for a limited Judiciary and writes, “Surely
there is no justification for a third legislative branch in the federal government, and there is even
less justification for a federal legislative branch’s reviewing on a policy basis the laws enacted
by the legislatures of the fifty states.”138
Because its activism causes the Judiciary to take on a legislative role, Rehnquist believes
the potential for abuse is high, especially given the lack of accountability that accompanies
appointment rather than election. He expresses his wish for the Judiciary to be popularly elected
just like the other branches, “Even if one were to disagree with me on this point, the members of
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a third branch of the federal legislature at least ought to be elected and responsible to
constituencies, just as in the case of the other two branches of Congress. If there is going to be a
council of revision, it ought to have at least some connection with popular feeling.”139 For Chief
Justice Rehnquist, it is absolutely essential that justices do everything in their power to limit their
interference with the decisions of elected officials to only those times when it was absolutely
necessary because of clear Constitutional violations. Rehnquist also places great weight in the
powers of the states and believes that the Judiciary should show equal restraint in dealing with
them. 140
In his article, Rehnquist criticizes injecting personal moral values into Constitutional
interpretation. He implies that some justices—not surprisingly he believes often those more
liberal—infuse their own morality into the decisions they make. For Rehnquist, this is a wholly
inappropriate use of their power. For him, the role of the justice is to decide cases as questions
of power. Personal preferences and even strongly held values must be put aside in order to fairly
evaluate constitutional claims. Furthermore, he points out that every person—including
himself—develops different values throughout their lifetime and there is no effective way to
evaluate the superiority of one set of morals over another. “There is no conceivable way in
which I can logically demonstrate to you that the judgments of my conscience are superior to the
judgments of your conscience, and vice versa. Many of us necessarily feel strongly and deeply
about our own moral judgments, but they remain only personal moral judgments until in some
way given the sanction of law.”141 Rehnquist finds it impossible to use this as the foundation of
his legal opinions and this, he says, enables him to take unpopular positions when necessary.142
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In his article, Rehnquist cites many of the same cases that Louis Boudin does in
Government by Judiciary as emblematic of dangers of an overly activist judicial branch. He
provides a brief summary of the historical context surrounding the Dred Scott Case and argues
that the justices applied the wrong notion of the “living” Constitution and issued a disastrous
opinion as a result. The Judiciary had effectively taken on the duties of the Legislative and
Executive branches and attempted to solve an issue that was not theirs to address. Rehnquist
writes,
The Court in Dred Scott decided that all of the agitation and debate in Congress
over the Missouri Compromise in 1820, over the Wilmot Proviso a generation
later, and over the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854 had amounted to absolutely
nothing. It was, in the words of Macbeth, “A tale told by an idiot, full of sound
and fury, signifying nothing.” According to the Court, the decision had never
been one that Congress was entitled to make; it was one that the Court alone, in
construing the Constitution, was empowered to make.143
Rehnquist argues that despite the fact that the Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) decision was
overturned by the American Civil War and the resulting Civil War Amendments, Chief Justice
Taney’s opinion injured the reputation of the Supreme Court for decades to come.144 Rehnquist
also cites Lochner v. New York (1905) and its further negative impact on the reputation of the
Supreme Court less than fifty years after the decision in Dred Scott.145
In his evaluation of Lochner, Rehnquist points out that by striking down the New York
statute limiting the working hours of bakers, the Judiciary was usurping the power of the State
Representatives to govern and make decisions for their constituents. Instead, the justices chose
to protect the liberty of contracts as superior to the power legislature to make policy decisions.
Rehnquist criticizes,
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The fourteenth amendment, of course, said nothing about any freedom to make
contracts upon terms that one thought best, but there was a very substantial body
of opinion outside the Constitution at the time of Lochner that subscribed to the
general philosophy of social Darwinism as embodied in the writing of Herbert
Spencer in England and William Graham Sumner in this country. It may have
occurred to some of the Justices who made up a majority in Lochner, hopefully
subconsciously rather than consciously, that since this philosophy appeared
eminently sound and since the language in the due process clause was sufficiently
general not to rule out its inclusion, why not strike a blow for the cause?146
It becomes clear from the writings of both William Rehnquist and Louis Boudin that each
man highly values a restrained and thoughtful Judiciary despite the fact their political
philosophies could not have been more different. Boudin, an extreme liberal with Socialist
sympathies, insists on judicial restraint by the Supreme Court being used to maintain and check
the powers of the judicial branch which could most easily be most abused. For Rehnquist, a
conservative on the Court, the ability of the people to self-govern had its base in majority rule
and the interference by the Courts inhibited this process.147 Despite both men believing that
Chief Justice John Marshall’s assertion of the power of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison
(1803) is a crucial step in the evolution of the American Judiciary, they also recognize that it
opened a virtual Pandora’s box of potential abuse. Chief Justice Rehnquist asserts,
In addition, Marshall said that if the popular branches of government-state
legislatures, the Congress, and the Presidency—are operating within the authority
granted to them by the Constitution, their judgment and not that of the Court must
obviously prevail. When these branches overstep the authority given to them by
the Constitution, in the case of the president and the Congress, or invade protected
individual rights, and a constitutional challenge to their action is raised in a
lawsuit brought in federal court, the Court must prefer the Constitution to the
government acts.148
He continues that if the Judiciary does not engage in restraint concerning the power of
judicial review, the core democratic value of majority rule will be nullified. He understands such
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judicial power to be extremely dangerous to the conception of American democracy by the
Framers.149
Boudin would agree that a real potential for abuse of this power exists and urges the
Court to grant the Executive and Legislative branches deference in their policy-making.
However, he is much less focused on its effect on majority rule in America. Boudin
demonstrates deep care and frustration for minorities in America but he identifies the activism of
the Court (through the 1930’s) as creating more harm than good for minority rights. Boudin uses
Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) and Lochner v. New York (1905), among other cases, as blatant
examples of the dangers of judicial activism. Unlike Rehnquist, Boudin was unable to comment
on the Warren Court’s activism during the Civil Rights Movement. Based on his evaluation in
Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), though, Boudin can be assumed to appreciate both judicial
restraint and the protection of minority rights as not wholly antithetical. Boudin quotes Justice
Harlan, whom he believes offered an appropriate constitutional philosophy that fostered judicial
restraint. Justice Harlan wrote,
But it is for Congress, not the judiciary, to say what legislation is appropriate;
that is, best adapted to the end to be attained. The judiciary may not, with safety
to our institutions, enter the domain of legislative discretion, and dictate the
means which Congress shall employ in the exercise of its granted powers. That
would be sheer usurpation of the functions of a co-ordinate department, which, if
often repeated, and permanently acquiesced in, would work a radical change in
our system of government”150 (Emphasis in original)
A difference that cannot be ignored between Boudin and Rehnquist is their underlying
constitutional philosophies. While they reach the same conclusion regarding judicial restraint,
they come from very different traditions. As Judge Posner notes in his 2011 Jorde Symposium
lecture, in recent years there has been a shift in favor of justices expressing specific and detailed
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constitutional philosophies to apply to cases to aid in decision-making. 151 This was true during
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s tenure on the Court, but was not nearly as prevalent when Louis
Boudin was writing. As a result, Boudin’s understanding of judicial restraint tends to be much
broader than that of Chief Justice Rehnquist. This was due to the fact that Boudin lived in a time
during which pragmatic decision–making on a case-by-case basis was the norm for Supreme
Court justices. Justices of his time demonstrated trends in their decisions but were not bound by
theories offered during their confirmations.
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Conclusion
Louis Boudin comments in his two-volume work Government By Judiciary that the
judicial power has dramatically changed throughout the history of the United States. From its
establishment by the Framers as the least powerful branch of the Federal government, to its
expansion with the development of the power of judicial review articulated in Marbury v.
Madison (1803), and each Court’s reaction to this power over time, Boudin identifies a notable
trend of the growing usurpation by the Court of the powers of the other branches of government.
Judicial power is no longer synonymous with Chief Justice Marshall’s description in 1803—
understanding the Court as an arbiter of questions of power in relation to the Constitution.
Through a series of activist decisions—both liberal and conservative—the Court has
established itself as the peacemaker for the nation, resolving contentious issues that the other two
branches can or will not. This was evidenced by both Dred Scott discussed in Chapter Three and
Brown discussed in Chapter Five. The Court also demonstrated its ability to negate certain
powers of the state to legislate for their constituents and to make specific policy decisions based
on the substance of legislation as was demonstrated by the Lochner Case and discussed in
Chapter Four. Through a series of decisions following Lochner, the Court showed that it was not
bound strictly by the precedents set for it by previous generations of justices and that the Court
could change positions regularly with no repercussions as was discussed in Chapter Five (Muller
v. Oregon (1908), Bunting v. Oregon (1917), Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923), and Burns
Baking Co. v. Bryan (1924)).
This increasingly activist trajectory by the Court worries Boudin as he attempts to
identify the changing limits on the judicial power. Boudin concludes that he can barely
recognize the Judiciary in the form that it was created by the Framers of the Constitution by the
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time he is writing in 1932. For Boudin, the Judiciary no longer only concerns itself with
questions of the power to legislate based on the Constitution, but rather relies on the political
opinions, moral values, and interpretation the Constitution of the justices themselves to decide
cases. Boudin writes, “Accident has no doubt played an important role in the development of
our constitutional law. But the general character of our government is determined by the class
or type of men who administer it under the Judicial Power” (Emphasis in Original).152
Boudin warns about the potential for judicial power to be abused by the justices and
urges that the justices must be restrained in their decision-making. He advocates strongly for the
application of a low-bar rational basis test to cases by the Court. In order to do this, Boudin
looks to James Thayer, Boudin’s major influence on his constitutional philosophy. The two both
argue that the Court should only strike down legislation as unconstitutional, on the state and
Federal level, if no rational man would be able to conceive it to be constitutional. Using this test
would negate the close 5-4 decisions by the Court and would allow for a more fluid functioning
of the government. In very rare instances the Court would identify legislation that was
completely irrational and the justices would be warranted in their exercise of the power of
judicial review.
With each expansion of its power, the Judiciary moves itself closer to possessing absolute
power, and Boudin charges that absolute power will always be abused by those who possess it.
He observes that in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), Chief Justice Taney attempts to resolve the
policy question of slavery and determine the “peace and harmony of the country.” 153 Through
this opinion, the Court comes close to granting itself absolute power over evaluating legislation.
He accuses, “A decision of the U.S. Supreme Court can, therefore, be overruled only by the court
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itself, or by special amendment to the Constitution. And even constitutional amendments are
effective only in so far as the U.S. Supreme Court approves them” (Emphasis in original).154
For Boudin, there are long-term implications from the expanding power of the Judiciary
and its impingement on the constitutionally afforded powers of the states and the other branches
of government. Boudin is clearly concerned with the shifting relationship between each branch
and the balance of power between the state and federal governments as a result of the Judiciary’s
abuse of power. He goes so far as to suggest that if the Court continues to decide cases not as
questions of power but as questions of substance, the existence of the American constitutional
democracy is in serious jeopardy. The slow but continual usurpation of power by the justices
creates, for Boudin, a government of men instead of a government of laws. Boudin writes, “A
careful examination of the actual course of decision will show that ours is not merely a
Government of Men, but a Government of Conservative Men. And since the actual power of
government is in the hands of a majority of the United States Supreme Court, our government
could very well be termed ‘Government by a Few Conservative Men.’”155
Boudin argues that if this trend of ignoring the true limits of the Court’s powers
continues, the Constitution will cease to be meaningful as a framework for the government of the
United States. Boudin identifies glimmers of hope from specific justices that recognize the
danger of the judicial power as he does. But, as history moves farther away from Chief Justice
John Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison (1803), the justices that advocate for the judicial
restraint that Boudin admires tend to increasingly be voting in the minority.
With the Civil Rights Movement came a shift in the constitutional philosophy of liberals
who had earlier advocated for restraint when addressing questions of economic policy. They
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became increasingly activist when cases concerning with civil rights and liberties were addressed
by the Court. The decidedly liberal nature of the Warren Court during the 1950’s and 1960’s
resulted in increased politicization of Supreme Court nominees. President Nixon attempted to
shift the Court from liberal to more conservative with his appointment of Chief Justice Warren
Burger. Burger, who was expected to reliably vote with conservatives, turned out to be less
predictable than President Nixon would have hoped and, in some cases, authored or signed on to
some very liberal decisions, such as Roe v. Wade (1972).
The conservative shift that President Nixon had hoped to ignite did eventually take place
approximately fifteen years later with the elevation of William Rehnquist to Chief Justice,
replacing Warren Burger. Chief Justice Rehnquist guided the Court in a conservative direction,
never deviating from his constitutional philosophy that emphasized the importance of majority
rule and the power of the states. As a result of this theory, Rehnquist tried to resurrect the
concept of judicial restraint within the Supreme Court.
Boudin valued the careful separation and balance of powers as articulated by the Framers
of the Constitution and the reliance on the popularly elected branches to make policy decisions
for the nation. He saw the proper role of the Judiciary as a safeguard against the abuse of power
by the other two branches. It was the duty of the Court to strike down legislation as void only
when irrational. The Court’s usurpation of authority by issuing opinions outside this limited
power was not only inappropriate in the eyes of Boudin, but would lead to an unchecked and
uncontrollable Judiciary.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, was more concerned with the balance of power
between the people and the government, both federal and state. He believed that majority rule is
the most essential aspect of the constitutional democracy and without it, the government by the
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people would cease to function. To preserve majority rule, Rehnquist would allocate great
power to the states to make decisions for their own citizens. This would also result in limiting
the powers of the federal government, especially that of the judicial branch. Rehnquist asserted
that the judicial branch is the most undemocratic aspect of the national government and,
therefore, the justices must be restrained.
Despite their vast political differences, Boudin and Rehnquist agreed that the Judiciary
must be restrained in its decision-making. They believed this, however, for very different
reasons and to achieve different goals based on the times in which they wrote. The two men
point to similar cases to demonstrate the problems that arise out an activist Judiciary. But,
Boudin and Rehnquist argue for restraint to be used in different ways, depending on the policy
issue in question. While Rehnquist cares most about majority rule, Boudin wants to avoid the
creation of a “government of men.” He recognizes, though, that given the judicial history of the
United States beginning with the development of the power of judicial review in 1803 by Chief
Justice John Marshall, the Judiciary has already expanded (and often abused) its powers. Boudin
believes that to a great extent, the transition from a government of laws to a government of men
has already taken place.
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